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CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF ARBITRATORS IN CHINA:
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Duan Xiaosong †
Abstract: This article is prompted by a Chinese criminal provision governing the
impartiality of arbitration. The goals of the article are to critically examine the criminal
statute created by the provision and to put forward some proposals for reform, which can
be employed to resolve the tension that exists between arbitrator impartiality and
deference to arbitration. Although the provision appears to eliminate the abuse of arbitral
power, it may raise more questions than it resolves. This article explores the problems
and undertakes a comparative analysis of the corresponding United States provision as
well as an analysis of some cultural and traditional elements influencing the criminal
statute in China. Ultimately, this article argues that the concerns can be addressed by
fine-tuning the rule in order to keep a balance between the previous two conflicting
values. Borrowing from U.S. experience, this article proposes a mechanism of judicial
interpretation. When contemplating the judicial interpretation, four aspects need to be
taken into consideration: private prosecution, criminal liability for the neutral arbitrator,
civil liability, and a detailed definition of the criminal provision. Considering these
aspects of judicial interpretation will ensure that China can retain the benefits of
arbitration without sacrificing impartiality.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Although international commercial arbitration in China started in the
1950s,1 it stood still until the adoption of the "reform and opening-up" policy
of the late 1970s. 2 China’s accession into the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) in December 2001 and the growing globalization of the world
economy have greatly increased international trade and investment in
China. 3 In the wake of the modern explosion of international trade and
transnational investment, arbitration has become “the accepted method for
resolving international business disputes.”4 Arbitration has also become a
†
Law lecturer, Southwest University (China); Ph.D. candidate, Southwest University of Political
Science and Law (China). The author would like to thank Judith A. McMorrow, Professor of Law, Boston
College Law School, for her guidance and valuable comments throughout the research and writing process.
1
The first arbitration commission in the People's Republic of China, the China International
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”), formerly known as the Foreign Trade
Arbitration Commission, was set up in April 1956. Introduction, CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND
TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION, http://www.cietac.org/index/aboutUs.cms (last visited Dec. 8, 2013).
2
LIU XIANGSHU, ZHONGGUO SHEWAI ZHONGCAI CAIJUE ZHIDU YU XUELI YANJIU (中国涉外仲裁裁决
制度与学理研究 ) [A JURISPRUDENTIAL STUDY ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRAL AWARD
SYSTEM OF CHINA] 24 (2001).
3
See INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL, CHINA’S FOREIGN TRADE (2011),
http://www.chinausfocus.com/library/government-resources/chinese-resources/documents/white-paperchinas-foreign-trade-december-2011/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).
4
YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 6 (1996).
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preferred method for foreign parties to resolve their legal disputes in China,
due in large part to the distrust these parties have of Chinese courts.5
Nonetheless, parties must recognize that China’s arbitration system is
very young. Although commercial arbitration started in the 1950s, the first
arbitration law, the Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China,
hereinafter Arbitration Law, is only twenty years old. 6 In contrast, the
United States has a long history of arbitration. The U.S. Congress passed
the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in 1925.7 The FAA provides that if
there is an arbitration clause, the court shall, on application of one of the
parties, stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has taken place.8 In
recent years, U.S. courts have expanded the range of enforceable arbitration
agreements to include agreements that cover areas of law previously thought
to be within the exclusive domain of courts.9
Parties from different nations tend to seek arbitration in order to
prevent an abundance of jurisdictional problems. 10 Unlike litigation,
arbitration provides a neutral venue for international disputes and aims to
ensure procedural fairness for both parties. 11 Arbitration permits parties
from different countries to exercise a great deal of control over how a
dispute will be resolved.12 The parties are free to tailor the proceedings to
meet their needs. Specifically, parties can contract to govern all disputes by
a certain set of laws or procedures.13 They decide the scope and content of
the arbitration, define its procedures, and choose the location of the
arbitration by specifying these stipulations in the arbitration agreement. 14
Most importantly, parties have the power to choose the decision maker.15
This freedom to select the arbitrator is why arbitration has been described as
5
Michael I. Kaplan, Solving the Pitfalls of Impartiality When Arbitrating in China: How the
Lessons of the Soviet Union and Iran Can Provide Solutions to Western Parties Arbitrating in China, 110
PENN ST. L. REV. 769, 780 (2006).
6
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongcai Fa ( 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 仲 裁 法 ) [Arbitration Law of the
People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People's Cong., Aug. 31,
1994, effective Aug. 31, 1994) available at http:www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/200712/12/content_1383756.htm [hereinafter Arbitration Law].
7
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–4 (1947).
8
Id. §§ 2–4 (1947).
9
For example, the disputes in respect of securities and antitrust laws are now deemed arbitrable.
Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49 DUKE L. J.
1279, 1279 (1999–2000).
10
Frederick Brown & Catherine A. Rogers, The Role of Arbitration in Resolving Transnational
Disputes: A Survey of Trends in the People’s Republic of China, 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 329, 334 (1997).
11
See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974).
12
DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 4, at 273.
13
See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 518.
14
See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 5 (2d ed. 1991).
15
IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW §3.2 (1st ed. 1995).
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“hiring your own private judge.”16 Arbitration benefits parties not only by
ensuring procedural fairness, but also by providing predictability, lowering
attorney fees, and increasing the privacy and expertise in decision making.17
The finality of arbitration is another advantage, which is often attractive for
its speed and cost-effectiveness.18 Arbitral awards are final and binding, and
can be enforced in the same manner as court judgments.19 Particularly with
the well-functioning international enforcement system under the 1958 New
York Convention, 20 arbitral awards are often easier to enforce than court
judgments. 21 With its acceptance and popularization, international
commercial arbitration now plays a very important role in settling private
conflicts.
Arbitrator bias, however, negates many of the benefits of arbitration to
commercial parties. 22 In China, where bribery of public officials is
prevalent, arbitral awards might also be tainted by bribery.23 For instance,
Jiang Hanwu, the former vice chairman of the Arbitration Commission in
Lian Yun Gang city, Jiangsu Province, was charged with bribery in 2001.24
The increased risk that Western parties may incur in this aspect of relations
with Chinese parties increases the importance of ensuring the impartiality of
the arbitrators deciding their disputes.25 The issue of arbitrator impartiality
is therefore critical to the development of arbitration rules and cannot be
ignored in the process of international private dispute resolution. The
legitimacy of international commercial arbitration relies heavily upon the
thoroughness of arbitration institutions as well as the independence and
impartiality of arbitrators.

16

MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §1:01 at 1 (3d ed. 2001).
See Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Ending Arbitration's Finality through Functional
Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 157–60 (2002–2003).
18
See Catherine Cronin-Harris, Mainstreaming: Systematic Corporate Use of ADR, 59 ALB. L. REV.
847, 853–54 (1995–1996).
19
See ZHAO XIUWEN, GUOJISHANGSHI ZHONGCAIFA (国际商事仲裁法) [INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION LAW] 5 (2004).
20
See generally Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Jun.
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention].
21
See Andrew T. Guzman, Capital Market Regulation in Developing Countries: A Proposal, 39 VA.
J. INT'L L. 607, 632 (1998–99).
22
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 778.
23
See Xuan Bingzhao & Zhou Zhibin, Wangfa Zhongcaide Ruzui Zhengdangxing Fenxi (枉法仲裁的
入罪正当性分析) [The Analysis of the Legitimacy of Distortion of Arbitration Law], in HEXIE SHEHUI DE
XINGFA XIANSHI WENTI ( 和谐社会的刑法现实问题 ) [THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF CRIMINAL LAW IN A
HARMONIOUS SOCIETY] 1758 (Li Jie et al. eds., 2007).
24
Id.
25
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 782.
17
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While Chinese arbitration has seen remarkable progress in a relatively
short period of time,26 many problems remain.27 Among those problems is
the issue of biased arbitrators. This article focuses on criminal liability for
biased arbitrators. Criminal liability is largely prompted by a provision
titled Wangfa Zhongcai Zui (Arbitration by “Perversion of Law”),28 which
was added to the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China29 in 2006
by Amendment VI (hereinafter the Amendment), an amendment designed to
punish biased arbitrators for their wrongdoings. 30 This article critically
examines the legal regime of arbitrator impartiality in China, including this
provision, and puts forward some proposals for reform. Part II provides a
brief description of the framework of the Chinese arbitration. Part III
presents a background of Arbitration by “Perversion of Law;” examines the
debate on the criminal statute; compares it with some provisions of U.S.
arbitration laws; and explores the relative Chinese legal culture, tradition,
and economic environment factors that underlie criminal liability of
arbitrators. Part IV gives evaluations from a jurisprudential perspective and
offers some reform proposals, borrowing from U.S. experience. The article
argues that the criminal liability should be limited only to the neutral
arbitrator and that a detailed definition is needed when applying the law.
Finally, Part V provides a summary, along with concluding remarks.
II.

THE ARBITRATION SYSTEM IN CHINA

Arbitration is by nature quasi-private and procedurally more flexible
than judicial mechanisms. 31 This allows arbitrators to work quickly and
26
See CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION, supra note 1; see
also Introduction to the Beijing Arbitration Commission, BEIJING ARBITRATION COMMISSION,
http://www.bjac.org.cn/en/about_us/index.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
27
For example, ad hoc arbitration is not legally recognized by Chinese law, and there are different
criteria for judicial review of arbitral awards between domestic and international arbitration. See ZHAO
XIUWEN, supra note 19, at 512-13, 518. See also infra Part II.
28
Article 20 of this Amendment inserted Article 399 (I) after Article 399 of the Criminal Law, which
is titled “Arbitration by ‘Perversion of Law.’” See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa Xiuzhengan (liu)
(中华人民共和国刑法修正案(六)) [Amendment VI to the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 29, 2006, effective June 29, 2006)
(China), art. 20, available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2008-01/02/content_1388005.htm.
[hereinafter The Amendment].
29
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa (中华人民共和国刑法) [Criminal Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong. July 1, 1979, effective Mar. 14, 1997)
available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384075.htm [hereinafter
Criminal Law].
30
See generally The Amendment, supra note 28. For a detailed description of the provision, see
infra Part III.
31
ZHAO XIUWEN, supra note 19, at 6.

APRIL 2014

CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF ARBITRATORS IN CHINA

347

more efficiently, which is very important for time-sensitive commercial
arrangements.32 Meanwhile, it provides parties with other advantages, such
as greater certainty and a higher level of expertise than the court-based
system.33 Arbitration mitigates the jurisdictional disputes amongst parties.34
International commercial arbitration has long been regarded as an effective
choice-of-forum mechanism to resolve international commercial disputes.35
Due to the near-universal acceptance of the New York Convention,36 parties
cannot resolve their disputes in multiple forums if one party contests the
decision of the arbitral tribunal because the Convention provides for the
confirmation of arbitration awards in member nations.37 This section will
examine the two categories of arbitration in the People’s Republic of China:
international commercial arbitration and domestic arbitration.38
International commercial arbitration started in 1956 with the
establishment of the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission (“CIETAC”). 39 In 1959, the China Maritime Arbitration
Commission (“CMAC”) was set up.40 Both CIETAC and CMAC regulate
international commercial arbitration, or foreign-related arbitration,41 because
they were designed to handle disputes arising from economic, trading,
32

For example, the lack of an appeal process in arbitration gives parties expedited finality in their
legal disputes. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2004) (limiting judicial review of arbitration awards to a few very
narrow situations); see also New York Convention, supra note 20, at art. 5 (narrowly restricting the
situations where a member nation may not confirm an arbitration award).
33
See ZHAO XIUWEN, supra note 19, at 36.
34
See Brown & Rogers, supra note 10, at 332.
35
ZHAO XIUWEN, supra note 19, at 9-10.
36
China has been a member of the Convention since 1987. See New York Convention Countries,
NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/contracting-states/list-ofcontracting-states (last visited Feb. 4. 2014).
37
Article V of the New York Convention provides the limited reasons why parties to the Convention
should not confirm an arbitration award. See New York Convention, supra note 20, at art. 5.
38
China has adopted a “two-track” system for domestic arbitration and international commercial
arbitration. In the Arbitration Law, Chapter VII, entitled “Special Provisions for Arbitration Involving
Foreign Elements,” has been set forth to deal with international commercial arbitration, which is also
known as foreign-related arbitration. The two types of arbitration are distinct. For example, the Foreignrelated arbitration commissions are established differently from Arbitration commissions (domestic
arbitration). Article 66 provides: “[f]oreign-related arbitration commissions may be organized and
established by the China Chamber of International Commerce.” Arbitration Law, supra note 6, at art. 66.
Article 10 states: “[a]rbitration commissions may be established in municipalities directly under the
Central Government and in cities that are the seats of the people's governments of provinces or autonomous
regions. They may also be established in other cities divided into districts, according to need. Id. at art. 10.
Arbitration commissions shall not be established at each level of the administrative divisions. See id.
People's governments of the cities referred to in the preceding paragraph shall arrange for the relevant
departments and chambers of commerce to organize arbitration commissions in a unified manner.” See id.
39
The history of CIETAC and its arbitration rules can be found at CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION, http://www.cietac.org/index.cms (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
40
See CHINA MARITIME ARBITRATION COMMISSION, http://www.cmac-sh.org/en/home.asp (last
visited Mar. 8, 2014).
41
See id.; CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION, supra note 1.
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transportation, and maritime activities involving a foreign element.42 The
arbitration rules and practices of CMAC are virtually identical to those of
CIETAC, so examination of the CIETAC rules and practices will suffice to
demonstrate the nature of Chinese international commercial arbitration.43 In
accordance with its rules, disputes arising between Chinese parties and/or
parties from Hong Kong, Macau, or Taiwan, or between Chinese-foreign
joint ventures and Chinese parties, are within CIETAC’s jurisdiction. 44
CIETAC is well-developed—it permits foreign arbitrators to be included in
the panel of arbitrators, 45 a fact that has helped to bring the CIETAC
Arbitration Rules more in line with recognized international standards. 46
However, a significant problem of cross-pollination appeared in 1996, which
resulted in ambiguity surrounding CIETAC's jurisdiction.
In contrast, domestic arbitration has a shorter history. With the
promulgation of the Arbitration Law in 1994, domestic local arbitration
commissions were gradually established mainly for resolving domestic
economic contract disputes or cases without foreign elements. 47 In fact,
there are other arbitration mechanisms available to some special domestic
disputes. For instance, employment disputes, 48 some intellectual property
rights disputes,49 and securities disputes50 are not arbitrated pursuant to the
42

See Arbitration Law, supra note 6, at art. 65.
See LIU XIANGSHU, supra note 2, at 35.
44
See China International Economic and Trade Commission Arbitration Rules (promulgated by the
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade/China Chamber of International Commerce, Feb. 3,
2012, effective May 1, 2012), art. 3, available at http://www.cietac.org/index/rules.cms.
45
See id., at art. 24.
46
See Ge Jun, Mediation, Arbitration and Litigation: Dispute Resolution in the People's Republic of
China, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 122, 133 (1996).
47
For example, the Beijing Arbitration Commission (BAC) was founded on September 28, 1995,
following the passage of the Arbitration Law. See BEIJING ARBITRATION COMMISSION, supra note 26.
48
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Zhengyi Tiaojie Zhongcai Fa (中华人民共和国劳动争议
调 解 仲 裁 法) [Law of the People's Republic of China on Labor-dispute Mediation and Arbitration]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2007, effective May. 1, 2008)
[hereinafter
Labor-dispute
Mediation
and
Arbitration
Law],
art.
2,
available
at
http://law.npc.gov.cn:87/home/begin1.cbs. Article 2 of the Labor-dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law
states: “[t]his Law is applicable to the following labor disputes arising between employing units and
workers within the territory of the People's Republic of China.” Id. Article 5 states, “[w]here a labor
dispute arises and the parties are not willing to have a consultation, or the consultation fails, or the
settlement agreement reached is not performed, they may apply to a mediation institution for mediation.
Where the parties are not willing to have mediation, or the mediation fails, or the mediation agreement
reached is not performed, they may apply to a labor-dispute arbitration commission for arbitration. Where
they are dissatisfied with the arbitral award, they may initiate litigation to a people's court, unless otherwise
provided for in this Law.” Id. at art. 5.
49
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangbiao Fa (中华人民共和国商标法) [Trademark Law of the
People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2001,
effective Dec. 1, 2001, amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2013, effective
May. 1, 2014), art 41, available at http://npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384018.htm
[hereinafter Trademark Law]. This article deals with Decisions on Registered Trademark Disputes, which
43
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Arbitration Law, but submitted to arbitration by reason of other specific
laws. Since these types of disputes are not commercial by nature and those
tribunals (Labor-dispute Arbitration Commissions, Trademark Review and
Adjudication Board, and State Council Securities Committee) are more like
administrative organs,51 they do not fall within the scope of this article.
However, a State Council Notice dramatically changed CIETAC’s
long-standing exclusive jurisdiction over foreign-related disputes.52 Article
3 of the State Council Notice provides that domestic arbitration commissions
now “have the power to accept foreign-related arbitrations when the parties
have agreed to submit disputes to such Arbitration Commissions.”53 On the
other hand, according to the newly revised 2005 CIETAC Arbitration Rules,
CIETAC can also accept cases involving domestic disputes.54 This allows
cross-pollinization between foreign-related arbitration matters with domestic
arbitration commissions and domestic disputes with CIETAC. Indeed, the
ambiguity of those provisions appears to be a source of conflict.55
provides: “[n]otwithstanding the preceding two paragraphs, if a registered trademark is in dispute, an
application may be filed for decision with the Trademark Review and Adjudication Board within five years
of the date when that trademark is approved to be registered.” Id.
50
See Guiro Faxingyu Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli (股票发行与交易管理暂行条例) [Interim Regulations on
the Administration of the Issuing and Trading of Stocks] (promulgated by State Council, Apr. 22, 1993,
effective Apr. 22, 1993), art. 80, available at http://law.npc.gov.cn:87/home/begin1.cbs [hereinafter Stocks
Regulations]. This article provides that “[d]isputes between securities dealing institutions or between a
securities dealing institution and a security exchange on the issuance or trading of shares shall be resolved
through mediation or arbitration under the auspices of an arbitration organ that has been established with
the approval of the SCSC or designated by the State Council Securities Committee (SCSC).” Id.
51
For example, the administrative department of labor under the State Council formulates arbitration
rules and the administrative departments of labor of the province governments provide guidance in labordispute arbitration within their own administrative areas. A labor-dispute arbitration commission is
composed of representatives of the administrative department of labor, the trade unions and the enterprises.
See Labor-dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, supra note 48, art. 18-19. The State Council's
administrative department for industry and commerce establishes a Trademark Review and Adjudication
Board to be responsible for handling trademark disputes. See Trademark Law, supra note 49, at art. 2.
SCSC is the agency in charge of the national securities market and is responsible for the unified
administration of securities markets throughout China in accordance with the provisions of laws and
regulations. See Stocks Regulations, supra note 50, art. 5.
52
GENERAL OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL, CIRCULAR OF THE GENERAL OFFICE OF THE STATE
COUNCIL REGARDING SOME PROBLEMS WHICH NEED TO BE CLARIFIED FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
ARBITRATION
LAW
OF
THE
PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC
OF
CHINA
(1996),
http://www.cietac.org/index/references/Laws/47607b541f984c7f001.cms (last visited February 4, 2014)
[hereinafter CIRCULAR].
53
Article 3 of the State Council Notice provides: “[t]he functions and duties of newly established
arbitration commissions are mainly to arbitrate domestic disputes; they may accept foreign-related cases if
the parties concerned make such choice. Newly established arbitration commissions shall adopt identical
charging standards for arbitration of either domestic or foreign-related disputes.” CIRCULAR, supra note
52, at art. 3. See also Brown & Rogers, supra note 10, at 346.
54
CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION, supra note 39, at
art. 3.
55
See Brown & Rogers, supra note 10, at 347.
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Another notable distinction between domestic and foreign-related
arbitration is the difference in criteria required for judicial review of arbitral
awards. The Chinese courts, which are officially named the People’s Courts,
can review not only procedural issues, but also the legal reasoning
supporting the domestic arbitral awards. 56 Conversely, in international
arbitrations the courts are not allowed to consider the legal merits to
overturn an award. Instead, the courts generally scrutinize procedural
issues,57 a practice that conforms to the New York Convention.58
Generally speaking, China’s international arbitral tribunals are better
established and more sophisticated than their domestic counterparts.59 “It is
important that they remain distinct from domestic arbitral tribunals, which
do not share CIETAC’s reputation.”60 In accordance with the New York
Convention, CIETAC awards are recognized and enforced in more than 140
countries. 61 CIETAC’s nearly 20,000 concluded arbitration cases have
involved parties from more than seventy countries and regions outside the
Chinese mainland, and its awards have been recognized and enforced in
more than sixty countries and regions.62 Since 1990, CIETAC’s caseload
has been one of the heaviest among the world’s major arbitration
institutions.63 However, the current two-track system can also create some

56

If a party can prove that evidence on the basis of which the award was made had been forged, or
that the other party withheld evidence sufficient to have an impact on the impartiality of arbitration, the
first party may submit an application for vacation of the award. See Arbitration Law, supra note 6, at art.
58.
57
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa (中华人民共和国民事诉讼法) [Civil Procedure
Law of the People’s Republic of China] art. 274 (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991,
effective Apr. 9, 1992, amended for the second time by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug.
31, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013) [hereinafter Civil Procedure Law], available at
http://law.npc.gov.cn:87/home/begin1.cbs.
58
Similar provisions can be found in the Convention. See New York Convention, supra note 20,
art. 5.
59
For example, a foreign-related arbitration commission may appoint arbitrators from among
foreigners with special knowledge in the fields of law, economy and trade, science and technology, etc.
See Arbitration Law, supra note 6, at art. 67. The foreign arbitrator may serve as a check on the arbitration
process to assure that it is fairly and impartially conducted. See Ge Jun, supra note 46, at 133.
60
As mentioned earlier, one of the characteristics of China’s arbitration is its “two-track” system
under which the foreign-related arbitration (or international commercial arbitration) is treated differently
from domestic arbitration. The international commercial arbitration is more in-line with international
norms and practices than domestic arbitration. Therefore, the international arbitral tribunals remain distinct
from domestic ones. See supra note 37, at 58. See also Brown & Rogers, supra note 10, at 338.
61
See CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION, supra note 1.
62
Id.
63
See id.
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ambiguity and fear that a foreign arbitrator might be found criminally liable
one day.64
III.

THE CRIMINAL PROVISION OF ARBITRATION BY “PERVERSION OF LAW”

On June 29, 2006, at its twenty-second meeting, China’s legislature,
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, adopted and
promulgated an important piece of law: Amendment VI to the Criminal
Law of the People's Republic of China (the “Amendment”).65 Although the
absence of arbitrator regulation seems astonishing, the passage of this
Chinese criminal provision indicates that only the most rigorous law,
criminal law, is sufficient to regulate the arbitrator liability system in China.
Under this law, biased arbitrators are subject to criminal liability:
Where a person, who is charged by law with the duty of
arbitration, intentionally runs counter to facts and laws and
twists the law when making a ruling in arbitration, if the
circumstances are serious, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term
imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal
detention; and if the circumstances are especially serious, he
shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than
three years but not more than seven years.66
Nevertheless, it does not suggest that the criminal approach is defect free. In
order to provide insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the provision
and context for an evaluation of the law in the next section, this section
examines A) the background of Arbitration by “Perversion of Law,” B)
current debates, C) the U.S. experience of arbitrators’ impartiality, and D)
the historical development of China’s legal system.
A.

Background of the Arbitration by “Perversion of Law” Criminal
Provision

International arbitration developed as an alternative form of dispute
resolution because of a fear that foreign courts would be biased in favor of
local parties, yet the impartiality of international arbitration itself is also
64
See Xu Qianquan, Wangfa Zhongcaizui Zhi Pipan (枉法仲裁罪之批判) [A Criticism of Law-bending
Arbitration], 3 GUANGXI MINZU XUEYUAN XUEBAO ZHEXUE SHEHUIXUE BAN (广西民族学院学报哲学社会学)
［J. OF GUANGXI U. FOR NATIONALITIES] 120, 124 (2006).
65
See The Amendment, supra note 28, at art. 20.
66
Id.
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important.67 In order to guarantee the legitimacy of the arbitration process,
the arbitral institution must ensure the neutrality of the arbitrator.68 Thus,
having a neutral and impartial arbitrator to resolve commercial disputes is a
fundamental goal in modern arbitration.69 In response to this goal, states
throughout the world enacted laws to deal with the arbitrator responsibility
in domestic and international arbitration. 70 Surprisingly, rather than
following the policy of developed nations, China’s legal policy on partiality
seems to take a slightly different track. Vacatur and refusal to implement an
arbitral award are the universal ways to deal with partiality of international
arbitration.71 These approaches are also used in China, but the Arbitration
by “Perversion of Law” provision uniquely imposes criminal liability on
biased arbitrators.72
In debating the Amendment, many arbitration scholars openly
objected to the inclusion of the provision because holding arbitrators
criminally liable does not comply with international practices. 73
Nevertheless, fears of arbitrators mishandling power and of a threat to
justice prevailed over objections.74 The provision falls within the category
of crimes regarding dereliction of duty.75 Article 399 of the Criminal Law
pertains to dereliction of duties of judicial personnel. This article was
formally named Civil and Administrative Judgment by “Perversion of

67

See YU XIFU, GUOJI SHANGSHI ZHONGCAI DE SIFAJIANDUYU XIEZHU (国际商事仲裁的司法监督与协助）
[THE JUDICIAL SUPERVISION AND ASSISTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION] 80–81
(2006).
68
See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Grabbert, 590 A.2d 88, 92 (R.I. 1991).
69
See YU XIFU, supra note 67, at 80.
70
See Liu Xiaohong, Queding Zhongcaiyuan Zeren Zhidu de Fali Sikao (确定仲裁员责任制度的法理思
考) [Jurisprudence Analysis of the Establishment of Arbitrators’ Liability], 5 HUADONG ZHENGFA DAXUE
XUEBAO (华东政法大学学报) [J. E. CHINA U. POL. SCI. & L.] 82, 85 (2007).
71
See ZHAO XIUWEN, supra note 19, at 454.
72
See Song Lianbin, Wangfa Zhongcaizui Pipan (枉法仲裁罪批判) [A Critical Analysis of the Crime of
Distortion of Arbitration Law], 62 BEIJING ZHONGCAI (北京仲裁) [ARB.BEIJING] 22, 32 (2007). Besides
China, similar criminal provisions for biased arbitrators can be found in Japan and Taiwan. See Keihō
(Keihō) [PEN. C.] 1907, art. 197 (Japan); Republic of China Criminal Law, art. 124 (Taiwan), translated at
law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawSearchNo.aspxNo.aaspx?PC=C0000001&DF=&SNo=124. See also Luo
Guoqiang, Wangfa Zhongcaizui Sibian (枉法仲裁罪思辨) [Thoughts on the Crime of Distortion of the Law of
Arbitration], 1 ZHONGGUO XINGSHIFA ZAZHI (中国刑事法杂志) [J. CHINA’S CRIM. LAW] 63, 71 (2009).
73
See Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 32.
74
See Xu Li, On Wangfa Zhongcaizui de Lifa Zhengdangxing Tantao (枉法仲裁罪的立法正当性探讨)
[Research About Its Legislative Righteousness Of Crime Of Misuse of Law in Adjudication], 5 FAXUE
ZAZHI (法学杂志) [LEGAL STUD. MAG.] 85, 88 (2009).
75
Chapter IX of Criminal Law, which covers article 397 to article 419, is named Crimes of
Dereliction of Duty. See Criminal Law, supra note 29.
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Law.”76 The purported legislative purpose of the criminal provision is to
regulate arbitrators’ conduct and guarantee fairness and justice in the course
of arbitration, which was previously considered a legal loophole.77 Because
arbitration competes with litigation, supporters contended that an arbitrator
should be similarly liable as a judge if he bends the law.78 Considering that
judges are criminally liable for biased rulings, it was unreasonable,
supporters contended, for arbitrators to escape a similar punishment. 79
Notwithstanding so much criticism about the criminal provision,80 the worry
that an arbitrator might misuse his power formed a sound basis for the
provision, as this worry is prominent in China.81
Arbitration became a popular means of dispute resolution only after
institutional reform and a growing openness to meet the needs of its rapidly
growing economy. 82 As an import from the West, arbitration is still new to a
large portion of China’s population. 83 Unlike the Western tradition of “rule
of law,”84 China has a unique tradition termed guanxi (rule of relationship).85
Guanxi means a complex web of informal personal connections. The
concept is a type of gift economy that involves the “cultivation of personal
networks of mutual dependence and trust.” 86 Someone seeking and
maintaining guanxi directly or indirectly with those who have authority over
social resources, no matter by what means, has a massive advantage, as the
latter would repay the former in the future according to the “rule of
76
Article 399 of the Criminal Law provides: “ [i]n civil or administrative proceedings, any judicial
officer who intentionally runs counter to the facts and law and twists the law when rendering judgments or
orders, . . . shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years or criminal detention.
If any judicial officer who takes a bribe and bends the law, which also constitutes a crime as provided for in
Article 385 (Bribery) of [the Criminal Law], he shall be convicted and punished in accordance with the
provisions for a heavier punishment.” The Amendment, supra note 28, at art. 20.
77
See Chen Zhongqian, Lun Wangfa Zhongcaizui de Sheli Danghuan (论枉法仲裁罪的设立当缓) [On
To Delay Setting up the Crime of Distorting the Law of Arbitration], 7 ZHONGCAI YANJIU (SPECIAL ISSUE)
(仲裁研究专论) [ARB. STUD. (SPECIAL ISSUE)] 1, 2 (2006).
78
Id.
79
See YU XIFU, supra note 67, at 88.
80
See Song Lianbin, supra note 72.
81
See id, at 32–33.
82
China International Economic and Trade Commission Arbitration Rules (promulgated by the
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade/China Chamber of International Commerce, Feb. 3,
2012, effective May 1, 2012), available at http://www.cietac.org/index/rules.cms.
83
See LIU XIANGSHU, supra note 2, at 20.
84
In Western societies, law is an end in itself, above and separate from government. The law
protects the rights of citizens and permits those citizens to shape their conduct in the knowledge that the
law will be applied fairly, consistently, and predictably. See generally James Hugo Friend, Foreword the
Rocky Road toward the Rule of Law in China: 1979-2000, 20 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 369, 374 (2000).
85
Carol A. G. Jones, Capitalism, Globalization and Rule of Law: An Alternative Trajectory of Legal
Change in China, 3 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 195, 197 (1994).
86
Id.
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guanxi.” 87 The “rule of guanxi,” also operative in other Asian societies,
appears to make it challenging for parties to find a mutually accepted “fair”
arbitrator, and even the selection of an arbitral institution problematic
because parties distrust each other. 88 In practice, there is the risk of
arbitrators taking bribes and ruling wrongfully. 89 The worry whether the
other party has guanxi with arbitrators makes the question of the arbitrators’
impartiality much more important. This problem is disconcerting because it
might lead to a cooling in commerce between China and foreign nations.
That is not the outcome China presently wants to encourage. 90 Thus,
understandably, due to lack of arbitrator ethics, criminal responsibility is
appropriate in the case of a biased arbitrator.91 As the culture of guanxi has
the potential to influence arbitrators and calls their neutrality into question,
the criminal liability provision was enacted as an attempt to ensure the
impartiality of the arbitrators.
A significant consequence of the provision is that it changes the way
arbitral awards are judicially reviewed. The power of courts and public
prosecutors will inevitably be expanded to review the merits of an arbitral
award,92 which is beyond the standard of procedural review according to the
New York Convention.93 In the Chinese criminal justice system, one of the
important aspects is the dichotomy drawn between public prosecution and
private prosecution. 94 Criminal cases are publicly prosecuted with the

87
See HUANG GUANGGUO, RUJIA GUANXI ZHUYI (儒家关系主义) [ CONFUCIAN RELATIONALISM]
12 (2006).
88
See Xuan Bingzhao & Zhou Zhibin, supra note 23, at 1758.
89
Zhang Yong & Huang Xiaohua, Lun Wangfa Zhongcaizui Yu Shouhuizui De Jinghe (论枉法仲裁罪
与受贿罪的竞合) [On the Overlap of Arbitration by “Perversion of Law” and Bribery], 5 FAXUEPINGLUN (法
学评论) [LAW REV.] 120, 120 (2008).
90
Fan Mingchao, Shangshi Zhongcai Shiyexia de Wangfa Caijuezui ( 商事仲裁视野下的枉法裁决罪 )
[Crime of Distortion of the Law of Arbitration under the Vision of Commercial Arbitration], 27
HEBEIFAXUE (河北法学) [HEBEI LAW SCIENCE] 125, 129 (2009).
91
See Luo Guoqiang, supra note 72, at 71.
92
See Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 35.
93
See New York Convention, supra note 20.
94
Both public prosecution and private prosecution can result in criminal punishment. Public
prosecution occurs when the proceedings are initiated by the People’s Procuratorates with the People’s
Courts, while in privation prosecution it is the victim, the victim’s legal representative, close relative, or
others who are entitled to initiate the proceedings and file a criminal case with the People’s Courts. See
CHEN ZEXIAN, CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW 163 (2009). All cases requiring initiation of a public
prosecution shall be examined for decision by the People's Procuratorates. See ZHONGHUA RENMIN
GONGHEGUO XING SHI SU SONG FA (中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法) [Criminal Procedure Law of the People's
Republic of China], art. 167 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1979,
amended for the second time by Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013) [hereinafter
Criminal Procedure Law], available at http://law.npc.gov.cn:87/home/begin1.cbs.
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exception of three categories of less serious crimes.95 In the former cases,
the public prosecutors, named People’s Procuratorates, bear the evidentiary
burden before the courts.96 In the latter, similar to civil litigation, the private
prosecutor (often the victim himself) is obligated to prove the wrongdoing of
the accused.97 Since a crime of dereliction of duty is a public prosecution
case,98 it is the People’s Procuratorates rather than the claimants who must
prove the crime. Before bringing cases to the court, the Procuratorates will
be given the chance to substantially review the arbitral award because they
need to investigate and collect evidence.99 In turn, the court has to review
the merits of the arbitration again in order to make a decision. This conflicts
with China’s obligation of procedural review under the New York
Convention.
B.

The Debate Surrounding the Criminal Provision

The criminal provision established the institutional framework for the
imposition of penal punishment on biased arbitrators. However, it raised a
host of complicated questions as well, which became the subject of national
debate. The questions concerned the nature of arbitration, the feasibility of
the criminal provision, whether the law is in line with international practice,
and the appropriate legal responsibility, criminal responsibility, or civil
liability, for the biased arbitrator.

95
Cases of private prosecution include the following: 1) cases to be handled only upon complaint;
2) cases for which the victims have evidence to prove that those are minor criminal cases; and 3) cases for
which the victims have evidence to prove that the defendants should be investigated for criminal
responsibility according to law because their acts have infringed upon the victim’s personal or property
rights, whereas, the public security organs or the People’s Procuratorates do not investigate the criminal
responsibility of the accused. See Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 93, at art. 170.
96
During the course of a criminal case, the People’s Procuratorates have the ability to exercise four
major powers. First, they have the right to investigate criminal cases assigned to them by the law, and to
take all kinds of coercive measures against suspects. Second, they examine cases submitted by the police
organs and decide whether to approve arrest or to prosecute suspects. Third, they have the right to
prosecute suspects, and to protest the judgments. Lastly, as a law supervisory organ, they have the right to
supervise all the criminal processes, including investigation, interrogation, trial, and execution. See WANG
GUIGUO & JOHN MO, CHINESE LAW 648 (1999).
97
Id. at 652. The burden of proof in a private prosecution case is on the prosecutor. If he lacks
criminal evidence and cannot present supplementary evidence, the People’s Court shall persuade him to
withdraw the private prosecution or order its rejection. See also Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 93, at
art. 171(2).
98
In cases involving crimes of corruption and dereliction of duty, the People’s Procurates shall
conduct the investigation and initiate a public prosecution. See Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 93, at
art. 136.
99
See Xu Qianquan, supra note 64, at 124.
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Arguments Against Criminalization of Arbitrator Bias

Prior to the legislation, the issue of penal punishment upon a biased
arbitrator had been at the heart of the discussion of the liability of arbitrators
and received a wide range of practical and academic attention.100 While the
criminal statute was an effort to fill the legal gap of liability for arbitrators,
many arbitration scholars have denounced the statute as having fallen short
of its goal.101 They argued that the criminal responsibility of an arbitrator is
not in line with international practice, as it disregards the contractual nature
of arbitration.102 Additionally, the vague wording makes the workability of
the criminal statute problematic.103
Arbitration is seen first as a matter of contract rather than a form of
adjudication.104 One of the continuing debates is indeed whether contract
traits rather than judicature characteristics form the cornerstone of, and
exercise pervading influence over, arbitration. 105 Critics argue that
analogizing arbitration to litigation may be arbitrary and imprecise.106 A
common objection to the criminal statute is that it is against the nature of
arbitration.107 It is important to understand that arbitration is not litigation
with another name.108 An arbitrator performs a task that resembles that of a
judge, yet there are critical differences between judges and arbitrators.
Arbitrators charge fees from the parties, whereas judges, as state personnel,
receive wages from the state budget.109 Further, arbitrators are often experts
chosen from the same industry in which the dispute arises, and are not
always required to have a legal education.110 Rooted within international
trade, disputants have chosen arbitration to settle controversies for hundreds
of years.111 It is the participants who shape the arbitration, which is then
100
See Lu Jing, Zhongcai Youxian Xingshi Zeren Chengdan ( 仲裁有限刑事责任承担 ) [On Limited
Criminal Liability for Distortion of the Law of Arbitration], 24 ZHONGCAI YANJIU (仲裁研究) [ARB.STUDY]
82 (2010). See also Liu, supra note 42, at 89.
101
See Liu Xiaohong, supra note 70, at 88–90.
102
Chen Zhongqian, supra note 77, at 2–3.
103
See Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 26–31.
104
Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 487 (1997).
105
Xu Qianquan, supra note 64, at 120–21.
106
As a matter of contract, arbitration is influenced by the respective bargaining strength of each
party. Thus, party-appointed arbitrators are a reflection of the parties' positions in the dispute. See Rau,
supra note 103, at 511. See also Chen Zhongqian, Lun Wangfa Zhongcaizui de Rending I (论枉法裁决罪的认
定(上)) [On When Should the Court Find a Violation of Arbitration Law I], 24 ZHONGCAIYANJIU (仲裁研究)
[ARB. STUDY] 72, 76 (2011).
107
Chen Zhongqian, supra note 106, at 77.
108
See Xu Qianquan, supra note 64, at 121.
109
See id.
110
See Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 33, 35.
111
See LIU XIANGSHU, supra note 2, at 2–3 .
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recognized by a state’s legal system through various private dispute
resolutions. 112 The rationale behind arbitration is the doctrine of party
autonomy: parties’ consent to address issues through arbitration should be
respected and enforced such that neither of the parties can initiate judicial
proceedings before the arbitration takes place.113
Opponents of the criminal statute also argue that judicial policy
should not allow public intervention in the private domain when parties have
mutually agreed to exercise their autonomy to arbitrate.114 Under this view,
arbitrators’ authority comes from the authorization of the parties instead of
the state because the private parties have the natural right of selfregulation. 115 Therefore, the nature of arbitration should be deemed a
product of contract between the parties and the arbitrators rather than a form
of judicature, and as a legal service rather than a form of judicial power.116
This is particularly important, as one goal of international arbitration is to
limit state influence on the dispute resolution process between and among
international parties. 117 Otherwise, the expected benefits of arbitration
would be dramatically reduced.118
Additionally, critics doubt that the criminal statute is workable
because of the ambiguity of the provision. 119 It is highly likely that in
practice the criminal statute will not function as expected because the
language in the Amendment offers little guidance as to what particular
conducts constitute the crime. 120 For instance, the first challenge is to
establish how the criminal statute covers the accused. Although the person
who commits the crime is referred to as “a person who is charged by law
with the duty of arbitration,” the term “person” is far from clear.121 The
description covers both arbitrators and any other personnel working in
arbitration commissions,122 which has caused some practical difficulties.123
112

Id.
Chen Zhongqian, supra note 106, at 73.
114
Id. at 76.
115
See Chen Zhongqian, supra note 77, at 3.
116
Id.
117
See ZHAO XIUWEN, supra note 19, at 17.
118
See Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 36.
119
See id, at 26-31.
120
Id. at 35.
121
See Xu Qianquan, Zhongcaiyuan Falv Zeren Zhi Jiantao II ( 仲 裁 员 法 律 责 任 之 检 讨(下)) [The
Criticism of Arbitrators Legal Responsibility II], 11 ZHONGCAI YANJIU (仲裁研究) [ARB. STUDY] 25 (2006).
122
For example, “anyone” can also refer to the chairman of an arbitration commission in accordance
with the provision. For example, the Arbitration Law states: “Whereas the parties concerned agree that the
arbitration tribunal shall be composed of three arbitrators, each of them shall choose one arbitrator or the
appointment to the chairman of the arbitration commission, with the third arbitrator jointly chosen by the
parties concerned or appointed by the chairman of the arbitration commission jointly entrusted by the two
parties. The third arbitrator shall be the chief arbitrator.” Arbitration Law, supra note 6, at art. 31.
113
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Furthermore, an arbitral award is often made on the basis of the majority
opinion among the arbitrators and dissenters need not provide a signature on
the award. 124 Suppose some arbitrators showed signs of bias and others
appeared objective.125 It would be unjust if an arbitrator who disagreed and
refused to sign was included as “person” and found guilty of Arbitration by
“Perversion of Law.”126
Second, defining intentionally is another fundamental issue. Neither
the Amendment itself nor the Arbitration Law provides detailed rules about
how intentionality should be ascertained. 127 By including this word, it
appeared to have precluded a negligent act.128 But it is very difficult, if not
impossible, to draw a line between an arbitrator’s intentional disregard of
law and a negligent mistake in the process of handling a case because it is
not easy for the court to discern an arbitrator’s intentions.129 In practice,
what satisfies intentionally is subject to interpretation.130
Third, the problem of explaining the expression “runs counter to facts
and laws” is particularly severe and disconcerting.131 The use of the word
“and” indicates that the crime exists only when both of the two conditions,
“runs counter to the facts” and “runs counter to the laws,” are satisfied.132
The enactment is silent about whether a crime exists when only one
condition is fulfilled.133 Further, as previously shown, both CIETAC and
domestic arbitration commissions have jurisdiction over international or
foreign-related disputes. 134 Following international practice, parties often
choose what law they want to govern interpretation and enforcement of their
123

Xu Qianquan, supra note 121, at 25.
Arbitration Law, supra note 6, at art. 53-54.
125
See Chen Zhongqian, supra note 106, at 78.
126
See id.
127
For the argument that the Arbitration Law provided no guidance for the application of the new
enactment. See Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 29–30.
128
An intentional crime is a crime committed with clear knowledge that the act will cause socially
dangerous consequences, and hopes for or is indifferent to those consequences. Intentional crimes always
result in criminal liability. However, a negligent crime occurs when an act, or a foreseeable act, may cause
socially dangerous consequences but continues in the action out of carelessness. Alternatively, a negligent
crime occurs when the actor has foreseen the consequences but erroneously assumes he can prevent them,
resulting in such consequences. Criminal liability is imposed for negligent crimes only when the law so
stipulates. See Criminal Law, supra note 29, at art. 14–15.
129
See Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 29-30. See also Lu Jing, supra note 100, at 84.
130
Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 29.
131
See Chen Zhongqian, supra note 105, at 78.106
132
Fan, supra note 90, at 127.
133
Id.
134
See China International Economic and Trade Commission Arbitration Rules (promulgated by the
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade/China Chamber of International Commerce, Feb. 3,
2012, effective May 1, 2012), art. 3, available at http://www.cietac.org/index/rules.cms.
See also
CIRCULAR, supra note 52, at art. 3.
124
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agreement.135 Sometimes, in amicable arbitration or ad hoc arbitration, no
applicable law is selected and arbitrators are empowered to disregard the
strictures of legal rules in search of more equitable resolutions to disputes.136
Therefore, what specific law do they refer to in these situations? If the
applicable law is a foreign law, it is questionable whether Chinese courts
have the competent jurisdiction to make a decision that an arbitral award
“runs counter to” a foreign law.137 Admittedly, such a decision on a foreign
law would constitute an infringement of sovereignty of a foreign country in
violation of a basic international law principle of sovereign equality.138
Further confusion arises with respect to the clause “if the
circumstances are extremely serious,” without detailed criteria of those
serious circumstances. 139 The enactment is silent on this crucial and
controversial area, which makes it difficult for courts to use the provision in
deciding what circumstances would be extremely serious.140
The criminal statute may also be incompatible with China’s
international obligations. 141 As previously outlined, China adopts a twotrack approach to judicial review of arbitral awards, under which Chinese
courts are not permitted to review any of the legal merits or reasoning except
procedural issues in international arbitration.142 A verdict of Arbitration by
“Perversion of Law” requires first of all a substantial judicial review of the
arbitral award. 143 Courts must request that the arbitration panel provide
reasons justifying its decision in order to judge whether criminal conduct
exists, but arbitral awards are often rendered without explanation of the
reasoning or even a complete record of the proceedings.144 Furthermore, a
domestic arbitration commission now has jurisdiction over both domestic
135

See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 518 (1974).
See LIU XIANGSHU, supra note 2, at 5.
137
See Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 35.
138
Zhang Junying, Shangshizhongcai Wangfaxingwei de Xingshi Guizhi Yanjiu (商事仲裁枉法行为的刑
事规制研究) [Study on the Criminal Rule of Perversion of Law in Commercial Arbitration], 4 SHANGCHANG
XIANDAIHUA (商场现代化) [MARKET MODERNIZATION] 311, 311 (2007).
139
Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 31.
140
Id.
141
See Huang Hui, Lun Wangfa Zhongcai Zui Zhi “Wangfa” Xing ( 论枉法仲裁罪之枉法性 ) [The
“Perverting” Nature of Law-bending Arbitration], 4 SICHUAN DAXUE XUEBAO (四川大学学报) [J.SICHUAN
U.] 120,124 (2010).
142
See Civil Procedure Law, supra note 57, at art. 274; Arbitration Law, supra note 6, at art. 58.
143
For a discussion of the specific difficulties brought by the two-track system, see Huang Hui, supra
note 141, at 124.
144
See Arbitration Law, supra note 6, at art. 54. A written arbitral award need only specify “the
arbitration claim, the facts of the dispute, the reasons for the decision, the results of the award, the
allocation of arbitration fees and the date of the award.” Id. The parties can agree to not specify the facts
of the dispute and the grounds for the award in a written arbitral award. Id. A written arbitral award shall
be signed by the arbitrators and affixed with the seal of the arbitration commission. Id. Arbitrators with
different opinions on the arbitral award may or may not sign the award. Id.
136
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and foreign-related disputes. 145 An arbitrator of a domestic arbitration
commission handling domestic and foreign-related cases must utilize
different criteria for judicial review.146 An international arbitrator, who may
be held criminally liable under domestic criteria, could be immune from
penal punishment under international standards, 147 because in accordance
with international standards there could be less chance to judicially
scrutinize the facts and merits, which are essential when an arbitrator is
found to run counter to the facts.
In determining whether an arbitrator is guilty, the courts must
scrutinize the merits and reasoning used in the arbitration proceedings.
However, in accordance with the New York Convention, the courts of
member states may only review the procedural issues of international
commercial arbitration. 148 That is to say, the facts and merits, including
even those with which the arbitrator might be found guilty of the crime, are
not within the scope of the scrutiny of the courts. Therefore, it is unlikely
that international arbitrators would be convicted of the crime, which makes
judicial review a deterrent only for domestic arbitrators.149 A responsible
and capable arbitrator would be overly cautious and understandably reluctant
to risk accepting appointment, which might cause the decline of the quality
of arbitration and eventually do harm to the development of arbitration as
well as rule of law efforts in China.150 The language of the Amendment is
too vague and simplistic to provide any concrete guidelines in practice, and
there is only a theoretical possibility that a biased arbitrator would be caught
and convicted of the crime. 151 The law remains theoretical since it is
difficult to apply in practice. 152 Nevertheless, the Amendment has been
criticized as being over-inclusive.153 Some opine that it only provides moral
force and that there are already enough rules that prevent arbitrator
misconduct.154 The existing remedies include application for the withdrawal
145

See CIRCULAR, supra note 52, at art. 3.
See Huang Hui, supra note 141, at 125.
While domestic arbitration is subject to judicial review of facts, arbitral decision-making, and
international commercial arbitration are immune from substantive scrutiny after an award is made.
International arbitrators actually do not have a chance to be convicted of “Perversion of Law.” If
international arbitrators could be found guilty of this crime, the courts would have to review the merits and
reasoning in arbitration proceedings first, which means a violation of China’s obligation under the New
York Convention that courts of member states are only entitled to reviewing the procedural issues of
international commercial arbitration. See New York Convention, supra note 20, at art. V
148
Id.
149
See Chen Zhongqian, supra note 106, at 78.
150
See Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 35–38.
151
Id. at 35-36.
152
See Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 36.
153
See Lu Jing, supra note 100, at 82, 85.
154
See Xu Qianquan, supra note 64, at 122-23.
146
147
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and replacement of an arbitrator, application for vacation of the award,
denial of enforcement of the award, notification of re-arbitrating by the
tribunal, and rejection of the application. 155 Occasionally, even penal
punishment can be used.156 Similar provisions are rare.157
2.

Arguments for Criminalization of Arbitrator Bias

Despite such criticisms, other experts are concerned with corruption
and arbitrator misconduct, which concern, for them, justifies the use of
criminal punishment.158 Many criminal academics and practitioners support
the use of penal punishment on arbitrators.159 People’s Procuratorates, for
example, have been strong advocates of the criminal statute.160 To them, the
idea that no arbitrator should intentionally misuse his power to go against
facts and laws comes from the notion that both arbitration and litigation are
the means to resolve civil disputes and they are in essence the same, no
matter the way in which they are manifested. 161 Further, the provision
would encourage high standards of integrity and lasting confidence in
arbitration proceedings.162 The arguments for criminalization focus mainly
155
According to the Arbitration Law, arbitration shall be carried out independently and free from
interference by administrative authorities, social organizations, or individuals; where an arbitrator has
privately met a party or agent or has accepted an invitation or gift from such party or agent, he must
withdraw and his name shall be removed from the list of arbitrators; where arbitrators demanded and/or
accepted bribes, practiced graft or made an arbitral award that perverted the law, a party may submit an
application for vacation of the award. See Arbitration Law, supra note 6, at art. 8, 34, 38, 58. Moreover,
where one or several arbitrators committed embezzlement, accepted bribes or practiced graft, or made an
award that perverted the law, People’s Courts shall rule to deny execution of the arbitral award. See Civil
Procedure Law, supra note 57, at art. 213, 258.
156
For example, although an arbitrator who accepts a bribe cannot be charged with bribery because
he is not state personnel, he may be accused of non-state personnel bribery or commercial bribery. See
Criminal Law, supra note 29, at art. 163.
157
One similar criminal provision is found in the 2006 Criminal Law of Republic of China (Taiwan),
Article 124, which stipulated the crime Decision by Perversion of Law. As of today, no case has occurred.
Therefore, some commentators aggressively contend that this fact proves that arbitrator misconduct is a
severe social problem only in the drafters’ imaginations. Zhang Wenxian, China’s Rule of Law in the
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on the social harm of arbitrator misbehavior and the quasi-judicial nature of
arbitration. 163 Some contend that the lack of workability is not a real
problem because it can be remedied by providing more detailed rules.164
Proponents also believe that the criminal statute fits within the reality of
China’s current economic and social situation.165
Advocates for criminalization emphasize the social harm of corruption
and misconduct in arbitration. Since all adjudicators should be neutral when
making a decision, the social harm of corruption and misconduct in
arbitration is as serious as in litigation, which is regulated under the 1997
criminal law as well. 166 As with most legal debates, the issue of the
appropriateness of a penalty cannot be sensibly examined without taking
into account the conduct’s social harm.167 In China, social harm is widely
believed to be a relevant factor in choosing to promulgate a criminal
statute.168 The concept of giving more consideration to the maintenance of
social stability has long been accepted. 169 An arbitral award is a final
binding decision equal to and potentially more final than that of the judiciary
because an arbitral award is not subject to any appellate review. 170
Arbitrators are usually free to use their own personal knowledge in making
decisions and are not obliged to follow rules of evidence.171 Meanwhile,
courts are generally deferential to an arbitral award and do not review the
legal merits to overturn it. 172 For the advocates of criminalization, these
features allow for abuse of arbitral powers. These advocates believe
arbitrators have an incentive to render an unfair award if they will benefit
from bribes or other personal benefits.173 Arbitrators can earn hundreds of
163
164
165
166

See Xu Li, supra note 74, at 88.
Luo Guoqiang, supra note72, at 64.
See Chen Wei, supra note 163, at 58-59.
A judge assumes criminal responsibility in that situation. See The Amendment, supra note 28, at

art. 20.
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See Xia Siyang et al., Wangfa Zhongcai Gaibugai Shou Xingfa Tiaozheng (枉法仲裁该不该受刑法调
整 ) [Is the Crime Arbitration by Perversion of Law Appropriate] JIANCHA RIBAO ( 检 察 日 报 )
[PROCURATORIAL DAILY], Jan. 23, 2006, at A6.
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Legal System], 33 HARBIN XUEYUAN XUEBAO (哈尔滨学院学报) [J. HARBIN U.] 58, 60 (2012).
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thousands to sometimes over a million dollars from a single arbitration.174
In the case of bribery, partiality in arbitration could result in actual injury to
the complaining party and social justice would then be greatly harmed.175
By promulgating the Amendment, the law establishes what might be a
credible penalty regime imposed on a biased arbitrator, even though the
cases of Arbitration by “Perversion of Law” are relatively rare. 176 The
advocates argue that “no crime without law; no penalty without law” is one
of the generally accepted principles of criminal law in most jurisdictions.177
Another powerful pro-criminalization argument is that arbitration is
quasi-judicial in nature and thus should be held to similar standards as the
judiciary. 178 The advocates for criminalization realize the fact that
arbitration resembles litigation and remains intimately dependent on a
national legal system.179 Arbitrators are expected to act like judges who will
do justice to all parties and guarantee them a fair hearing and a just award.180
More importantly, there is an expectation that arbitral awards, like
judgments, are to be enforced by national courts.181 Thus, for the pro-crime
advocates, arbitration cannot be viewed merely as a contract of legal
services, but the power to make a judicial decision, which falls within the
authority of the judicature.182 Respecting parties’ intent to arbitrate under
the doctrine of party autonomy does not imply a respect for an arbitrator’s
freedom to disregard the law.183 While an arbitrator is a private judge, to be
a judge means to be empowered to make a decision in accordance with the
law instead of going against it.184
For the advocates for criminalization, the qualification of arbitrators is
also a key factor in introducing the criminal statute. They argue that
building a highly qualified team of arbitrators is extremely difficult, given
that China’s market economy has not had much time to develop.185 Unlike
174
John Yukio Gotanda, Awarding Costs and Attorneys' Fees in International Commercial
Arbitrations, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 1–3 (1999).
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(刑法修正案（六）第二十条枉法仲裁罪的理解与适用) [Understanding the Application of Article XX.
of the Amendments to the Criminal Law (VI): Distortion of Arbitration Law] 1 GUANGZHOUSHI GONGAN
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judges, arbitrators are not required to obtain any legal training or pass any
professional examinations before performing their duties. 186 Lacking
training, it is more likely for them to intentionally go against the law and
make a wrongful ruling for the sake of money than judges.187 After all, the
fee amount is often determined by, or at least influenced by, the arbitrators
themselves.188 Arbitral awards are sometimes rendered in favor of the party
with guanxi.189 It is certain the situation would be much worse if there were
no such a strict law regarding the impartiality of arbitrators.190
Since the lack of workability issue can be addressed by promulgating
further detailed rules, the advocates for criminalization argue that it should
not be used as a justification to deny the validity of the criminal provision.191
For the pro-crime advocates, while the provision is far from developed,
especially with respect to its workability, it seems unreasonable to reject the
criminal statute based solely on this shortcoming.192 After all, most crimes
in Chinese criminal law are virtually non-enforceable without further
detailed rules. 193 Even with a measure of skepticism, it is reasonable to
make an exception and argue that the provision will deter the corrupted
arbitrators in arbitration.194 Having established the validity of the criminal
statute, the court can proceed to articulate a judicial standard for imposing
liability on arbitrators who violate the statute. This change is a necessary
step to address the appearance of partiality and will ensure the enactment is
one that contributes to China’s arbitration framework.195
The advocates for criminalization also argue that the criminal
provision is appropriate given the present stage of economic development in
China.196 Due to the underdevelopment of market economies and the short
history of arbitration, absolute party autonomy in some Asian countries and
districts—such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—appears not to work
well because of a lack of enforcement, making it necessary to govern
arbitration with strict laws. 197 In addition, while such laws have been
186
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attacked for being contrary to international practice, some contend that
arbitration would benefit from the imposition of more severe punishments to
decrease the possibility of arbitral misuse.198 It would ensure the healthy
development of arbitration and make China an attractive place for
international arbitration. 199 A more well-developed arbitration system in
those regions appears to be achieved through the support of public power.200
Those countries do not have to wait hundreds of years to naturally raise the
professional quality arbitrators, establish a code of arbitrator ethics, and
cultivate social trust in arbitration.201 Moreover, given social and cultural
differences, it would be inadequate for China to follow the same route of
regulating arbitrator conduct as the West. The development of arbitration
can be promoted by means of legislation, making full use of the advantages
from both the common law and continental law systems.202
3.

Conclusions Based on Both Sides of the Debate

As previously shown, the criminal liability of biased arbitrators has
been widely debated. The arguments against criminalization criticize the
provision for its failure to conform to either the nature of arbitration or the
international trend of minimal judicial intervention.203 In addition, critics
regard the poor wording and lack of guidance in the statute as fatal flaws.
Conversely, the strength of the arguments for criminalization has come
to be recognized by legislators. 204 A powerful argument is the analogy
drawn between the social harm of judicial corruption and that of arbitrator
misconduct. If a judge who acts with bias and perverts the law assumes
criminal responsibility, why should a “private judge” be immune from
similar punishment? Arbitrators are no less susceptible to corruption than
professional judicial personnel.205 At the very least, the criminal provision
appears to embody the principle that like situations must be treated alike.206
Proponents of the provision argue that the justice of arbitration and
protection of the rights and interests of parties can be achieved in practice
through the regulation of arbitration with state interference, whereas its
opponents are against public intervention and believe that the previous goals
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
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can only be realized through the development of arbitration itself. The
possibility of criminal conviction would presumably deter biased arbitrators.
While such deterrence is a net social good, there is another risk: abuse of
the statute by prosecutors. The prosecutor, by threatening to bring a criminal
prosecution unless the arbitrator rules a certain way, could undermine the
independence of the arbitration process. The debate over the criminal statute
remains largely inconclusive and, as such, will continue into the foreseeable
future, as will empirical studies seeking to resolve the debate.
Admittedly, the arguments for criminalization are not without
criticism. It is universally acknowledged that arbitration is different from
litigation: the former has historically been a dispute resolution mechanism
for transactions that implicate only private law. 207 Thus, the power of
arbitrators should not be deemed the same as that of judges. But apart from
this, the lack of workability is a good argument that invites serious
consideration. Of greatest concern is the conflict between China’s domestic
law and its international obligations. Unfortunately, in practice, the
provision is not likely to serve its purported function because the problem of
workability cannot be addressed by the provision itself.208 Thus, it urgently
needs to be restructured. To address these problems, it is beneficial to
compare China’s arbitration system with other international arbitral
institutions.
C.

Situating the Chinese Debate with the U.S. Experience Regarding the
Impartiality of Arbitrators

In sharp contrast to the current Chinese approach, which has minimal
provisions concerning arbitrator neutrality, but a sharply punitive criminal
statute if there is bias by “perversion of law,” the U.S. approach has been
quite different. As early as 1632, Massachusetts became the first colony to
adopt laws supporting arbitration as a means of dispute resolution.209
The analysis of arbitral impartiality in the United States relies on an
analogy to judicial impartiality.210 Arbitrators are viewed in the same light
207
See Christine L. Davitz, Note, U.S. Supreme Court Subordinates Enforcement of Regulatory
Statutes to Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements: From the Bremen's License to the Sky Reefer's Edict,
30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 59, 63 (1997).
208
See Song Lianbin, supra note 72, at 36.
209
In 1925, the federal government enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The statute
recognized the benefits of arbitration and established a national policy favoring arbitration. See Steven A.
Certilman, This Is a Brief History of Arbitration in the United States, 3 NEW YORK DISP. RES. LAW. 10, 10–
12 (2010).
210
See Claudia T. Salomon et al., Arbitrator’s Disclosure Standards: the Uncertainty Continues, 63
OCT DISP. RESOL. J. 76, 82 (2008).
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as judges and therefore must be held to the same standards of impartiality as
are imposed on judges. 211 As a judge is immune to civil and criminal
liability for his wrong rulings,212 an arbitrator does not have to assume any
legal responsibility for a wrong arbitral award either.213 The usual remedies
for an arbitrator’s unfairness include removal of the arbitrator and vacatur of
the award. 214 The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides that an
arbitration award may be vacated “[w]here there was evident partiality or
corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.” 215 To show “evident
partiality” by an arbitrator under the FAA, a party either must establish
specific facts indicating actual bias toward or against a party, or show that
the arbitrator failed to disclose to the parties information that creates a
reasonable impression of bias. 216 The Supreme Court held “this rule of
arbitration and this canon of judicial ethics rest on the premise that any
tribunal permitted by law to try cases and controversies not only must be
unbiased but also must avoid even the appearance of bias.”217 Nevertheless,
the Seventh Circuit found “arbitration differs from adjudication, among
many other ways, because the ‘appearance of partiality’ grounds for
disqualification of judges does not apply to arbitrators; only evident
partiality, not appearances or risks, spoils an award.”218
U.S. appellate courts have established four factors to determine if a
claimant has demonstrated evident partiality: 1) any personal interest,
pecuniary or otherwise, the arbitrator has in the proceeding; 2) the directness
of the relationship between the arbitrator and the party he is alleged to favor;
3) the connection of the relationship to the arbitration; and 4) the proximity
in time between the relationship and the arbitration proceeding.219 When
considering each factor, the court should determine whether the asserted bias
is direct, definite, and capable of demonstration, rather than remote,
uncertain, or speculative, and whether the facts are sufficient to indicate the
arbitrator’s improper motives. 220 The Supreme Court expressed disfavor
211
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with any notion that the slightest pecuniary interest would constitute evident
partiality.221
As discussed above, many arbitral tribunals have a three-arbitrator
panel. 222 Under the common arrangement, each party designates one
arbitrator (party arbitrators or non-neutral arbitrators) and the parties
collectively select a third (neutral arbitrator). Party arbitrators are not
expected to be as impartial as neutral arbitrators.223 “Evident partiality” is a
ground for vacatur only for neutral arbitrators because non-neutral
arbitrators, unless otherwise agreed, serve as representatives of the parties
appointing them.224 In other words, absent overt corruption or misconduct in
the arbitration itself, no arbitrator appointed by a party may be challenged on
the ground of his relationship to that party. 225 Furthermore, a party with
constructive knowledge of the potential partiality of an arbitrator may waive
its right to challenge an arbitration award based on evident partiality if it
fails to object to the arbitrator’s appointment or the arbitrator’s failure to
make disclosures until after an award is issued.226
Vacatur of an arbitration award is appropriate under the FAA only in
exceedingly narrow circumstances, such as when arbitrators are partial or
corrupt, or when an arbitration panel manifestly disregards, rather than
merely erroneously interprets, the law.227 An arbitration award can only be
vacated on one of four exclusive statutory grounds: 1) corruption, fraud, or
misconduct in procuring the award; 2) partiality of an arbitrator appointed as
a neutral arbitrator; 3) an overstepping by the arbitrators of their authority or
such imperfect execution of it that a final and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made; 4) a failure to follow the procedure
of the Arbitration Code unless the party applying to vacate the award
continued with the arbitration with notice of the failure and without
objection; or 5) the arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law.228
221
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A financial interest in the outcome of the arbitration or a direct
relationship with a party are relevant considerations when determining
whether an arbitrator's relationship is material to the arbitration at issue, for
purposes of determining whether failure to disclose a conflict of interest
warrants vacatur of an award under the FAA. 229 An arbitrator has the
obligation to disclose to the parties any interest or bias, and failing to do so
might constitute “evident partiality,” 230 though no specific provision
pertaining to disclosure has been established in U.S. law. 231 In addition,
peculiar industry practices and norms are considered in determining whether
an arbitration award is subject to vacatur, particularly with an arbitrator’s
full and timely disclosures regarding business relationships with the
parties.232 Under the evident partiality standard, arbitrators are held to a less
strict disclosure regime than the appearance of partiality standard that
applies to judges.233 According to the revised Uniform Arbitration Act, an
arbitrator has a continuing duty to disclose any fact he learns after his
appointment if a reasonable person would consider it likely to affect the
impartiality of the arbitrator.234
The arbitrator has a duty to disqualify him or herself upon discovery
of sufficient reasons for such action, in order to avoid prejudicing an
effective arbitration.235 This self-disqualification of the arbitrator is required
under the Rules of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), which
require any person appointed or to be appointed as an arbitrator to disclose
to the AAA any circumstance likely to give rise to justifiable doubt as to the
arbitrator’s impartiality or independence, including any bias or any financial
or personal interest in the result of the arbitration or any past or present
relationships with the parties or their representatives.236
In principle, arbitrators are not required to explain an arbitration
award and their silence cannot be used to infer grounds for vacating an
award. 237 A party seeking vacatur of an arbitration award on grounds of
229
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evident partiality has the burden of proof; to meet this burden, the party must
demonstrate that a reasonable person would conclude that an arbitrator was
partial to the other party to the arbitration.238 Specifically, the party that
alleges that an arbitration award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other
undue means must: 1) establish the fraud by clear and convincing evidence;
2) demonstrate that the fraud was not discoverable by the exercise of due
diligence before or during the arbitration hearing; and 3) demonstrate that
the fraud was materially related to an issue in the arbitration.239 Generally, a
controversy of merits between parties to arbitration cannot be challenged as
an allegation of evident partiality or corruption by the losing party.240 It is
largely for this reason that the merits of an award are not subject to judicial
review.241 Courts will not review the validity of the arbitrator’s reasoning,
and may not review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an arbitrator’s
award.242 Thus, the general rule is that an arbitrator’s decision cannot be
reviewed for errors of fact or law.243 In addition, “California’s legislature
has reduced the risk to the parties . . . by providing for judicial review only
in circumstances involving serious problems with the award itself, or with
the fairness of the arbitration process.”244 Arbitration awards have a longer
history of publication in the West than in China, which makes it more
difficult to hide or disguise a distortion of law.245
The U.S. approach works for a well-developed legal system with a
strong rule of law model, but it is less clear that it would work well for
China’s arbitration system. To fully understand why the Chinese approach
using a criminal provision is a rational choice, it is important to place the
arbitration process in the context of the history of the Chinese legal system.
D.

Stepping Back: Exploring the “Perversion of Law” Provision in Light
of the Historical Development of Chinese Legal System

In order to fully comprehend the criminal provision of arbitrator
responsibility, it is necessary to obtain some perspectives on the historical
development of the Chinese legal system as a whole as it functions in
practice. The current Chinese legal system is still heavily burdened or
238
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influenced by traditional forces.246 For example, corruption has been long
regarded as one of the most serious crimes in China.247 Penal punishment,
including the death penalty, has been applied to state officials found guilty
of accepting bribes.248
Without a fundamental knowledge of the Chinese legal tradition, a
plain reading of the provision might lead readers to make a misguided
attempt to apply their own ethnocentric experiences to a quite distinct legal
system. Analyzing some cultural and traditional elements influencing the
criminal provision demonstrates some probable reasons for the statute from
a historical perspective. The analysis suggests that a criminal law-oriented
legal culture, a civil law tradition, and an underdevelopment of market
economy in China contribute to the penal liability of arbitrators.
1.

Chinese Legal Culture

Law operates in a cultural context and is impacted by the culture
around it, yet that culture is in turn affected by the operation of law. 249
Arbitration by “Perversion of Law” became a criminal provision due to
various social and cultural elements. Chinese legal culture, which differs
greatly from those of Western countries, is at the heart of the issue. The
dominance of Confucian thinking influenced Chinese attitudes toward
law.250 The basic philosophy underlying ancient Chinese law is a belief in
harmony, which leads officials to deal with legal cases in terms of a
“situation to be restored” rather than in terms of “individuals seeking
justice.” 251 Any recourse by citizens to legal process was regarded as a
disturbance of harmony and a shame not only for both parties, but also for
246
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their families, relatives, and clans.252 Traditionally, the preferred means for
settling most civil disputes is to resort to informal mediation rather than to
bring their disputes to court, which reflects the attitude among many Chinese
of avoiding litigation as much as possible.253
In accordance with this theory, two prominent characteristics in
China’s ancient legal system have to be mentioned. One is that the law was
only a tool of government policy and all legislation was criminal law, named
Xing.254 Xing, similar in meaning to Bing (war) in old Chinese, originated
from the state policy of violence, and both Xing and Bing constitute two
sides of the coin. 255 Xing concerns an internal policy of violence; Bing
represents a foreign policy.256 The law was equated with violence, and there
was no bifurcation between criminal and civil law.257 The state took little
interest in large areas of society, notably contract and commercial law:
sales, loans, and banking. 258 These areas could be regulated and were
regulated if any state interest became involved.259 Thus, in the eyes of an
average Chinese citizen, law for a long period of time meant one thing:
punishment. 260 Historically, the Emperor was concerned primarily with
maintaining order; his attention, and the attention of local bureaucrats, was
only incidentally drawn to what would be called civil matters today.261
The other prominent characteristic of the Chinese legal system is that
the law was actually regarded as an accessory to moral education, and claims
of morality were always held superior to those of law. 262 For instance,
natural harmony would best be preserved if men behaved in accordance with
Li (the teaching of morality), which recognized the inequality of persons on
account of social status, age, gender and local kinship ties.263 Li, used in
252
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conjunction with Xing, included a set of moral standards of conduct in
different situations appropriate for persons with high social status.264 These
standards shaped the attitudes that were considered to be morally correct and
were regarded as the ideal for relationships in society.265 If ordinary people
could be taught Li by precept, example, and symbolic ritual, there would
have been no need for anything like Xing. But for those refractory persons
who failed to make their behavior conform to Li, punishments had to be
prescribed in the form of penal law.266 Therefore, the distinction between
law and morality was sometimes indeterminate in practice.267
There was no category of public law and private law in early Chinese
codification. 268 Most of these codes focused on punishment for
administrative breaches of bureaucratic procedure or for conduct considered
disruptive to social order. 269 These laws were all public by nature even
though they were commonly applied in private fields.270 Despite being penal
in form, the provisions of the codes covered all private matters. For
instance, the codes covered loan conflicts, marriage, and succession, which
are classified as civil law under Western jurisprudence.271 In fact, there were
few commercial disputes in ancient China which were solved by laws.272
The criminal law and morality-oriented tradition was the mainspring
of China’s ancient legal system and method of law enforcement.273 Of the
two, the criminal law is probably the more important element, as “law” and
criminal law have generally been considered equivalent in the historical
context of China.274 The criminal law tradition also embodied the need for
state rule at that time, which resulted in centralization of state power.275 The
traditional pattern of Chinese government was authoritarian and
264
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bureaucratic. 276 There was no concept of “checks and balances” or
“separation of powers.”277 Even courts have always been a functional arm
of the Chinese bureaucracy.278 For example, in imperial China the central
government appointed local officials. 279 They exercised a wide range of
functions, being generally accountable for the good order and prosperity of
their districts, for the collection of local taxes and supply of corvée labor,
and concurrently discharging judicial duties when occasion arose.280 When
the concentration of power in a society enlarges, inevitably the criminal
legal system becomes more developed.281
When the notion of centralization of state power is so dominant that
the state and collective interests surpass those of individuals, any
infringement of private rights could be interpreted and deemed as damaging
to social order and state interests.282 The state and the people will clearly
express their attitude towards wrongdoers in the form of revenge and
punishment.283 The scope of public matters was therefore greatly expanded
and it is unsurprising that all laws in ancient Chinese society were criminal
laws, or at least laws with criminal elements.284 This attitude better explains
why the partiality of arbitrators becomes a social concern and criminal
punishment—instead of breach of contract or damages—is eventually
considered as a remedy to address the problem.285
At the dawn of the 20th century, a legal reform by the Qing Dynasty,
the last imperial dynasty, aimed to imitate Western legal systems.286 It was
generally recognized that if China was to play a significant part in world
affairs, the Chinese would have to bring their law in line with the modern
systems of the West.287 The most distinguishing substantive change was the

276

LIANG ZHIPING, supra note 247, at 54.
See id., at 49-53.
278
See id., at 54, 61.
279
See J. L. Brierly, et al., LAW AND GOVERNMENT IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 310 (Odhams Press).
280
Id.
281
See Tan Zhongzheng, Xingfa Jieru Shangshi Zhongcai de Lillun Fansi (刑法介入商事仲裁的理论反思)
[A Theoretical Reflection on the Involvement of Criminal law Through Criminalization of Distortion of
Arbitration Law], 71 BEIJING ZHONGCAI (北京仲裁) [ARB.BEIJING] 64, 68 (2010).
282
Id.
283
Id.
284
ZHANG ZHONGQIU, ZHONGXI FALÜ BIJIAO YANJIU (中西法律文化比较研究) [COMPARATIVE STUDIES
OF CHINESE AND WESTERN LEGAL CULTURES] 96 (Law Press 2009).
285
See Tan Zhongzheng, supra note 281, at 78.
286
Yang Xiaoli, Dui Qingmo Falv Yizhide Sikaoyu Jiejian (对清末法律移植的思考与借鉴) [A Thought
and Reference on the Legal Reform in Late Qing Dynasty], 1 LILUN DAOKAN (理论导刊) [JOURNAL OF
SOCIALIST THEORY GUIDE] 110, 110 (2010).
287
Id.
277

APRIL 2014

CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF ARBITRATORS IN CHINA

375

separation of civil laws from criminal laws. 288 However, the whole
development of modern law in China was hampered by the inability of the
regime to create a satisfactory pattern of supporting institutions.289 At the
very least, the principle of law reform was accepted, but much still needed to
be done.290
To date, the ancient Chinese legal tradition continues to impact the
legal process in at least two aspects. First, lawmakers are inclined to employ
criminal laws to maintain stability in large areas of social life. 291 This
feature, a distinctive Chinese characteristic, is still strong and might remain
so in the foreseeable future.292 Meanwhile, criminal provisions often contain
moral statements.293 Second, due to lack of a tradition of private rule of law,
average people have less trust in private rights and are more accustomed to
turning to state power for their sense of security.294 Because of the long
history of Confucianism influence of moral teaching, local officials were not
only government officials and judges appointed by the central government,
but were also ideally expected to be models and educators on a moral level,
and were called “father-and-mother officials.”295 That understanding is also
why corruption became a felony where the officials’ rule was not as good as
their name suggested.296
Law is a passive instrument whose operation can be either promoted
or impeded by culture. The distinction between Eastern and Western legal
cultures seems much more pronounced than the distinctions among different
Western legal cultures.297 It is difficult to compare different legal cultures
that originated from different legal traditions. Taking those diametrically
opposed traditions into account, the Chinese arbitration system is within the
larger framework of China’s national legal system and it evolves with that
national system. With no Western rule of law tradition on one side, and a
288
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strong influence from local criminal law-favored and morality-oriented
tradition on the other, it appears that penal responsibility of arbitrators is not
only the best choice in the eyes of Chinese authorities, but also desirable for
the vast majority of people.298 This is not surprising given the ambivalent
value of criminal law for modern China.
2.

Civil Law Tradition

It was only a century ago that China started systematically codifying
civil laws.299 Following the Legal Reform of Qing Dynasty, for the first
time a division between civil and criminal law was substituted for the
traditional classification according to administrative departments.300 From
1929 to 1931, a civil code was introduced, based on the legal codes of
Germany and Japan, which now has a direct offspring in Taiwan.301 Legal
ideas were directly copied from one legal system to the other.302 Legislators
were content with formalism and law-making. 303 For these reasons, it is
often believed that the current Chinese legal system can be classified as part
of the civil law family. 304 The influence of civil law in the criminal
provision is apparent because, in general, civil law systems favor codified
legislation as opposed to judge-made rules, and in common law systems it is
difficult to hold judges liable for misuse of the law.
One of the enduring differences between the common and civil law
systems is with respect to what is actual law.305 If the law is only defined as
statutes, then “law” in China means something much different than it does in
the United States. In common law countries, case law is commonly believed
to be the main source of the law, whereas in civil law countries, the law is
primarily based on statutes.306 The latter jurisdictions have put emphasis on
legislation, and people find themselves with more interests in statute-making
than dispute resolution. 307 Civil law judges are thus described as
298
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“mechanically appl[ying] legislative provisions to given fact situations.”308
This feature embodies the deductive method of the civil law system, which
is distinct from the inductive one of common law.309
China introduced the deductive method into its domestic legal
system.310 In civil law countries, a dichotomy often exists between “paper
law,” or the law in published regulations, and a law in action. 311 This
dichotomy seems more exaggerated in China than in other countries.312 As
arbitration is a significant part of the justice system on which Chinese
society relies, it is not surprising that the legislature believes that it is in the
public interest to establish a generally accepted enactment to regulate
arbitration.313 If punishments are to act as deterrents, it is important to have
them systematized and published so that arbitrators know the consequences
of wrong-doing. It is unclear to what extent the criminal provision of
arbitrator responsibility reflects the status quo in China. However, much of
China’s formal law does not generally reflect practice and has not been
developed with an eye to existing social realities.314 This difference results
in certain regulated areas being unregulated in practice. 315 The Chinese
overconfidence in the power of legislation helps explain the provision
regardless of the significant gap between the law de facto and the law de
jure. Although officially enacted, the provision does not yet represent actual
practice in China, and can hardly be expected to function well, especially
when the provision is so abstract that it has little workability as a “living”
law.316
Another noteworthy aspect is the influence of the judge in different
legal systems. Civil law adjudicators should mechanically follow the law
(statutes), rather than “create” the law.317 Parties go to court only to resolve
disputes in the civil law system where statutory law, and in particular the
civil codes, are not interpreted, but are rather simply applied by judges to
308
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determine the outcome of cases. 318 While civil law judges have broad
managerial powers, they are expected to apply the law in an almost
mechanical way, remaining controlled instruments of the legislature.319 In
fact, there is no room for judges’ participation in the creation or
transformation of legal rules.320 Conversely, it is readily acknowledged that
in the United States, parties seek to achieve changes in the law and judges
make law. 321 The task of a common law judge is to evaluate counsels’
competing arguments about hyper-factual analogies and subtle distinctions
in prior decisional law. 322 They have express law-making and policycreating functions. 323 In addition, many civil law judges consider it an
important part of their job to help the parties reach an amicable settlement.324
In the amicable settlement, civil law judges play a positive role and
sometimes have to “disregard” the law. Thus, they are more likely to “twist
the law.” However, judges in the common law system are comparatively
passive in their fact-finding role. Notably, civil law judges have more
chances to engage in “perversion of law.” Without doubt, their impartiality
duties need not be, and cannot be, the same as those of common law
judges.325 A common law judge is not accountable for his decision, even if
unfair, or for any loss the parties may thereby incur.326 Nor is an arbitrator,
who is deemed to be a quasi-judge.327 Decisions that deviate from the law
would not be considered an inappropriate violation of impartiality
obligations in the common law system.328 Since a U.S. judge has the power
to make law, he could hardly be charged with “disregard of law.” Crimes
like adjudicators’ “perversion of law” appear only to be found in Asian
countries with a civil law tradition.329 These countries lack experiences in
arbitration, which leads to the misleading judicial referent that arbitrators
and judges are both subsets of adjudicators and they should abide strictly by
318
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the statutes in a similar way. 330 The orientation of Arbitration by
“Perversion of Law” offences have, to some extent, been deeply rooted in
this tradition.
3.

The Underdevelopment of China’s Market Economy

The traditional Chinese society differed sharply from the
contemporary Western one in that the former was an agricultural countryside
society whereas the latter was a society based on market economies. 331
Agriculture was viewed as the natural form of economy in ancient China.332
Beginning early in the imperial dynastic period, the state adopted a policy of
encouraging agriculture and restraining commerce. 333 The prevailing
attitude was that war and agriculture were the only occupations fit for the
people. 334 The law did little to protect merchants. 335 On the contrary,
sanctions were placed on those who chose to engage in commercial activities
rather than agricultural work. 336 The Chinese rulers even issued decrees
criminalizing trade.337 These events led an entire nation to lose interest in
commerce. 338 Furthermore, Chinese leaders wished to control the beliefs
and ideas of the populace in order to preserve sociopolitical stability. 339
With fewer market transactions, there would be less movement among the
Chinese population and lowered risk of the exchange and dominance of
ideas such as equality, freedom, and democracy.340
Unlike a market economy, which is a society of strangers, the
agricultural society of ancient China was a society of acquaintances.341 In
this society, traditional moral education played a more important role than
law. 342 Confucian thought, emphasizing harmony and inequality among
people of different social statuses, had a meaningful influence on
government and individual behavior. 343 There was a strong sense of
330
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extended family and continuity between father and son, ancestors and self,
and the dead and the living. 344 Moreover, in a much simpler and closer
society, it is easier to enforce complete subordination of the individual to the
state, exalt the absolute authority of the ruler, and regiment all citizens by
the merciless enforcement of a brutal code of law and punishment.345
As shown in history, China suffered greatly from the suppression of
the market economy.346 Although Chinese civilization dominated the world
for many hundreds of years, it ultimately fell far behind during the Ming
dynasty (1368 to 1644).347 Chinese people began to engage in significant
foreign trade during the mid-sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 348
Astonishingly, no laws pertaining to trade developed during this time, and
foreign trade did not create enthusiasm in commerce.349 As trade increased,
foreign businesses and their governments came to exert increasing influence
over Chinese affairs.350 China lost many aspects of its sovereignty to foreign
powers after a series of wars.351 The comprehensive attempts to create a
formal legal system governing commerce began only in 1979.352 In the last
four decades, a large body of laws and regulations has been enacted with the
aim of creating rules that would support an economy based on market
incentives, while retaining the basic principles of socialism.353 Despite the
movement toward market economics, real change was a gradual process and
the Chinese economy remains, to some extent, under state control.354 Since
344
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an economy based even partly on market principles requires significant
decentralization of economic decision-making, there are conflicts with the
centralized state power in Chinese legal culture. One must keep in mind that
China is a country without a tradition of governance by law.355
Arbitration is widely believed to be an inherently private system of
dispute resolution and a product of a market economy.356 This perception is
supported to some extent by the history of arbitration and the degree of
parties’ control in shaping arbitration proceedings. 357 However, the
development of arbitration in China has not followed the same track of
market economy as that in the West.358 China’s commercial environment is
significantly different.359 Chinese arbitration lacks the purported popularity,
custom, and ability of private governance that American arbitration provides,
due to the incomplete development of the market economy.360 While China
is transitioning from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented
economy, the latter is extremely young, having just been formally proposed
in the 1990s.361 There were few arbitrators with comprehensive knowledge
of, and experience in, trade, maritime, economics, and law. 362 The
immaturity of the market economy and the socialist central planningfeatured tradition thus provide arbitration with less soil for growth.
It is important to note that the development of arbitration in China is
not due to the maturity of its market economy or the principle of party
autonomy, but as a result of government promotion.363 Although arbitration
commissions are proclaimed to be administratively independent from both
the local and national governmental units in accordance with Arbitration
Law,364 in fact they are far from truly independent.365 Most of them are in
economy, and designates it as the leading force in the nation's economy. Article 7 provides that: “The
State-owned economy, namely, the socialist economy under ownership by the whole people, is the leading
force in the national economy. The State ensures the consolidation and growth of the State-owned
economy”. See XIANFA art. 7 (1982) (China).
355
See Friend, supra note 84, at 379.
356
See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968) (White, J.,
concurring).
357
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Commercial Arbitration, 30 TEX. INT'L L. J. 1, 5 (1995).
358
Wang Luyu, supra note 274, at 29.
359
See Mao Jiaqi, supra note 339, at 76.
360
See Xu Qianquan, supra note 105, at 120–21.
361
See Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform after Twenty Years, 20 NW. J. INT'L L.
& BUS. 383, 387, 405 (2000).
362
See Ge Jun, supra note 46.
363
See Xuan Bingzhao & Zhou Zhibin, supra note 23, at 1756.
364
Arbitration commissions are independent from administrative authorities and have no subordinate
relationships with administrative authorities. There are no subordinate relationships between arbitration
commissions themselves. See Arbitration Law, supra note 6, at art. 14.
365
See Xuan Bingzhao & Zhou Zhibin, supra note 23, at 1757.
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some respects linked to various administrative authorities in that their
existence depends on the manner and degree to which they are supported by
the local Chinese governments.366 It is unsurprising that arbitrators are thus
easily viewed as government officials, and the standard of arbitrator
impartiality is naturally expected to be the same as that of judges. 367
Furthermore, there is no Chinese code of ethics for arbitrators.368 Therefore,
regulation of arbitrators can hardly be realized through a common practice,
market rules of competition, or reputation. On the contrary, regulation must
be dependent upon state power and a criminal provision.
EVALUATIONS OF THE CRIMINAL STATUTE AND PROPOSALS FOR
REFORM

IV.

China’s arbitrator liability system diverges in some respects from both
civil law and common law in order to accommodate its peculiar cultural
context. One rather unexpected move by the Chinese legislature was that
they imposed criminal liability on biased arbitrators, which is rarely found in
the rest of the world. 369 Arbitration can be efficient, inexpensive, and
harmonious.370 As wide discretion is left to the parties, their attorneys, and
the arbitrators to fashion the procedure as they wish without any judicial
interference,371 it is possible for arbitrators to “betray” the trust of the parties
and rule against the provision of the law. 372 However, the Chinese
legislative attitude toward arbitration, demonstrated by the criminal statute,
seems to be unfriendly to arbitrators and discourages deference to
arbitration. To prevent the misconduct of a biased arbitrator, holding him
criminally responsible appears to be the best alternative due to the emphasis
on criminal law in the Chinese legal culture. Analyzing the criminal
provision demonstrates that “when arbitrators step into judges’ shoes, they
seem to be wearing them on the wrong feet.”373 However, there are some
366
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additional ways to help reform the criminal liability provision. Since the
provision is abstract, there is much room relating to how to apply it. Some
possible solutions such as private prosecution, criminal liability for the
neutral arbitrator, civil liability, and a detailed definition of the criminal
provision have also been proposed with the purpose of removing the
workability limitations of the provision and making it function well. This
part explores A) evaluations of the criminal provision and B) reform
proposals.
A.

Evaluations on the Criminal Provision

With the enactment, the task of ensuring arbitrator neutrality in China
presents a number of possible barriers, both in perception and reality. While
the criminal provision has been articulated, its purported effect is
questionable because, as previously discussed, the ambiguity of its
provisions make enforcement uncertain. On the other hand, the ambiguity of
the provision will undoubtedly hinder arbitrators’ power to evaluate the
evidence at their discretion as well as provide People’s Courts and People’s
Procuratorates the opportunity to abuse their power. A misapplication of the
ambiguous provision will infringe on the legal rights and interests of the
arbitrator and the parties. The Chinese legislature made an inaccurate
analogy concerning arbitrators and judges when enacting the law without
carefully examining the harsh consequences of a criminal penalty.374 This
results in the power of judicial review with arbitration expanded and the
review cost increased. In turn, it seemingly would have had some
negative impact on the arbitrator market and the development of arbitration
in China.
1.

Inapt Analogy Between the Role of Arbitrators and Judges

The Chinese legislature made an inapt analogy between the role of
arbitrators and that of judges, in which the former are considered virtually
identical to the latter. After all, arbitrators are not officials, as judges are.375
Therefore, some scholars have claimed that if it was necessary to create a
criminal provision dealing with arbitrator misconduct, it would be better
phrased as fraud or infringement upon property, on the basis of contract,
rather than a crime of dereliction of duty.376
374
375
376
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To ensure impartiality, it is imperative for China to regulate the biased
arbitrators. The law makers, however, address the concern with a more
severe means than may be necessary—criminal liability. A position that all
adjudicators should be neutral and arbitrators should behave as impartially
as judges confuses the distinction between arbitration and litigation.
“Despite the resemblance between arbitration proceedings and court
proceedings, it is important to keep in mind that the former is the result of a
private contract while the latter arises from the state’s authority to resolve
disputes and to compel compliance.” 377 Arbitrators, as private actors,
“perform their function for private gain.” 378 Consequently, blindly
transplanting the criminal provision of Judicial Personnel of “Perversion of
Law” and applying it to arbitrators is an ineffective method to achieve the
desired social goals of impartiality and justice.379
2.

High Cost to Dispute Resolution

The criminal provisions give the People’s Procuratorates power to
intervene in arbitration. An increase in incidents of intervention carries the
risk of an associated increase incost of arbitration.
The crimes of dereliction of duty, which the state personnel who
exercise state power may commit under the current Chinese law, involve a
public prosecution case.380 As Arbitration by “Perversion of Law” has been
provided under the category of crimes of dereliction of duty, the suit should
be filed by the People’s Procuratorates instead of the complainant. 381
Therefore, the People’s Procuratorates have been granted the power to
review the findings of facts and application of laws in arbitration in order to
prove the crime before the court. Further, in order to determine whether a
“biased” arbitrator has gone “against facts and laws” and render a ruling, the
People’s Courts have to examine and investigate the substantial parts of an
arbitral award again, 382 which is equivalent to a retrial. That inquiry,
however, challenges the finality of arbitration. Thus, the courts’ power has
been greatly expanded. For many disputants, although the resolution is
ostensibly by wayof arbitration, it is the court’s ruling that ultimately
resolves the case.383 Arbitration itself serves no important purpose. The cost
377
Although an arbitrator performs a task that resembles that of a judge, there are critical differences
between judges and arbitrators. Guzman, supra note 9, at 1302–03.
378
Id. at 1303.
379
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380
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381
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383
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of dispute resolution has been increased because the statute seems to impose
an additional level of litigation. The offence appears to be moving farther
away from the principle of deference to arbitral rulings.
3.

Prelude to Abyss of Conflicts

The criminal provision conflicts with China’s international obligations
and lacks detailed rules. The legislature has put itself and the judicial
authority into a dilemma, in that the review of the merits of arbitration does
not conform to China’s international convention obligations, whereas
omission of criminal liability is against China’s criminal statute. 384 If
international commercial arbitration is not subject to substantive scrutiny in
China, then it fails to provide sufficient supervision as the criminal law
requires.385 The likely outcome is that only domestic commercial arbitrators,
not international arbitrators, will be convicted. 386 Such discrimination
towards domestic arbitrators would damage the integrity of China’s criminal
justice system.
But to guarantee equal prosecution, the People’s
Procuratorates would have to review the merits and reasoning of
international arbitration proceedings, which constitutes a violation of the
New York Convention.387 Furthermore, a foreign law is commonly applied
in international commercial arbitration.388 It is not appropriate for a Chinese
court to make a decision concerning the interpretation of a foreign law,
which may constitute an infringement of foreign sovereignty in violation of
the basic principle of international law, since the foreign law is enacted and
should only be interpreted by the foreign authority. 389 Moreover, the
determination of foreign law is another problem on account of the
complexities of different languages, inaccurate understanding of the laws,
and varying legislative intent. 390 Therefore, Chinese judicial organs’
inherited way of thinking in terms of domestic law might bring about real
“Verdict by Perversion of Law.”
Without detailed rules, the crime of Arbitration by “Perversion of
Law” is of little practical value. Besides what has been mentioned earlier,391
384
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the provision has not been defined well enough and there is still much
ambiguity.392 Sometimes an arbitral award is rendered through mediation,393
which is not required to be in accordance with law.394 In such a case, it is
very difficult to determine whether there is “arbitrator running counter to the
law.”395 In addition, an arbitrator is criminally liable only when his or her
conduct is intentional, but the law is silent on the arbitrator’s liability for
negligence resulting from a lack of professional care and due diligence.396
More importantly, it provides no clue to distinguish an intentional act from a
negligent behavior. 397 Another unreasonable situation could occur if a
foreign arbitral award made by a Chinese arbitrator is recognized and
enforced by a Chinese court, but another Chinese court finds the arbitrator
guilty of “Perversion of Law.” 398
4.

The Harsh Consequences of Criminal Liability

Excessive or inappropriate criminal penalties may prevent productive
conduct and should be minimized. 399 The criminal penalty can result in
harsh consequences to the individual, his or her family, and indirectly to
society as a whole.400 A state should avoid misusing a criminal penalty and
instead tailor a penalty that avoids excessive, ineffective, or costly penalties.
In a modern society, with the focus moving towards citizens’ rights and
interests, civil laws play a more important role than criminal laws. 401
Criminal laws should be cautiously applied, as lawmakers should attempt to
procure maximum social benefits—effective prevention and control of
misconduct at a minimum social expense—by reducing or eliminating
criminal penalties. 402 China should address the issue of arbitrator
impartiality, but it should consider the potential harms associated with penal
punishment. Some scholars are even worried that the law might be easily
392
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misused which, in turn, would deter many foreign candidates that otherwise
would have been appointed as arbitrators.403 It is a double-edged sword that
might harm both the state and the individual. Lawmakers should avoid
employing criminal punishment as much as possible, and only consider that
remedy as a last resort. The previous function of criminal liability discussed
above may be replaced by some other means of social regulation, such as a
code of ethics or civil liability for arbitrators.
B.

Proposals for Reform

As outlined earlier, the newly established criminal liability regime for
arbitrators in China is riddled with problems. The current regime can be
described as a legislator-based system, which is characterized by paternalism
and rigidity.404 It appears that impartiality of arbitration and deference to
arbitral rulings are two conflicting values. This problem is particularly
severe and disconcerting in China. The simplistic approach of the criminal
enactment needs to be reformed because it is unable to achieve the goal of
arbitrator impartiality. This does not suggest, however, that China should
wholly abandon the criminal provision
In discussing the reform of the regime of arbitrator criminal liability, a
better method for realizing the goal of reconstruction is through a judicial
interpretation of the criminal statute, borrowing from the U.S. approach of
deference to arbitration. That is to say, during the judicial review of arbitral
award, a court should carry out its responsibilities subject to the requirement
of respecting the substantial matters such as the finding of facts and the
application of laws in arbitration. In general, it must be kept in mind that
“although the arbitrator performs a task that resembles that of a judge, there
are critical differences between judges and arbitrators.” 405 The goal of a
judicial interpretation is to design an effective mechanism to ensure fairness
and justice in the course of arbitration and, at the same time, give deference
to an arbitral award. In restructuring the criminal provision of a biased
arbitrator, four aspects need to be taken into consideration: 1) private
prosecution, 2) criminal liability for the neutral arbitrator, 3) civil liability,
and 4) a detailed definition of the criminal provision.

403
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Private Prosecution

To place an important check on the power of the People’s
Procuratorates, Arbitration by “Perversion of Law” could be better reframed
as a crime of private prosecution through judicial interpretation. Rather than
rely on heavy-handed public prosecution, judicial interpretation of the
criminal provision can require private parties to exercise their private right
of action if there is arbitrator misbehavior. The complainant, instead of the
People’s Procuratorates, should accuse the “biased” arbitrator of the crime
and bear the burden of proof. A comparable U.S. provision requires that a
party seeking vacatur of an arbitration award on the grounds of evident
partiality must demonstrate “that a reasonable person would have to
conclude that an arbitrator was partial to the other party to the arbitration.”406
After such a reform, the People’s Procuratorates would no longer have
the power to prosecute an arbitrator. Converting the prosecution from a
governmental power into a party’s right could limit the potential for misuse
of the criminal provision, since it is more difficult for a complainant—who
has limited power to collect evidence compared to the People’s
Procuratorates—to demonstrate a violation in court. The more difficult it is
for the complainant to bring an action, the higher the threshold is for
implementation of the criminal provision. Thus, there exists less potential
for the misuse of the provision. In addition, the U.S. approach in finding
proof of corruption and fraud can be referenced in structuring the private
prosecution.
One potential concern regarding private prosecution is that it would
promote too much litigation. Some critics worry that if losing parties in
arbitration are able to sue the arbitrator, they will frequently misuse the
right.407 This concern is misplaced: private prosecution does not necessarily
lead to a flood of litigation.408 As the losing party bears a heavy burden to
establish specific facts that indicate improper motives on the part of the
arbitrator, they have more difficulty collecting evidence than in a public
prosecution. Without sufficient evidence, the losing party will likely
recognize that their probability of success in a suit against the arbitrator is
low. A party that has lost in arbitration will also expect to lose before the
courts. In fact, the losing party fulfills the vast majority of arbitral awards.

406
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408
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Only a small fraction of all parties with disputes make a court filing, and
only a small percentage of those that are actually filed go to trial.409
2.

Criminal Liability Only for the Neutral Arbitrator

The most popular method for appointing arbitrators to an arbitral
panel in international disputes is for each side to appoint one arbitrator, with
a third arbitrator appointed either by the two selected arbitrators or by the
arbitration commission or another appointing authority. 410 Non-neutral
arbitrators have long been considered agents of the parties in many
jurisdictions.411 In the U.S., it is acceptable for non-neutral arbitrators to be
impartial and only the neutral arbitrator is required to be neutral.412 The
most important aspect of an arbitrator’s impartiality is the duty of
information disclosure,413 especially the information concerning a particular
interest or identity.414
In China, a significant issue that needs to be clarified is whether nonneutral arbitrators assume the same penal responsibility as a neutral
arbitrator. For example, if an arbitral award is rendered on the basis of the
opinion of the majority, and the arbitrators who make the decision are
accused of Arbitration by “Perversion of Law,” it is not fair for the nonneutral arbitrator to face the same punishment since he is not supposed to be
“neutral.” Non-neutral arbitrators sometimes are selected because a party or
its counsel anticipates that an arbitrator of a particular type will react
favorably to the arguments that the party plans to present, which, as to
potential receptivity, is one of the advantages of arbitration. 415
Unfortunately, nothing in the current Chinese law provides either a

409
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distinction in liabilities among different arbitrators or a detailed working
procedure of the criminal statute concerning the disclosure duty.416
To ensure a smoother transition and structural adjustment, attention
should be paid to the distinction between arbitrators on the panel, as they
have different incentives in arbitral proceedings.417 There seems to be no
good reason why all arbitrators should be required to be identically impartial
since they have varied ways of appointment. 418 Some flexibility is
necessary. A clarification should be made in future judicial interpretation
such that only the neutral arbitrator should be criminally liable for
Arbitration by “Perversion of Law.” Such clarification would have a
positive impact, especially since China is in a critical stage of encouraging
the development of arbitration.
3.

Civil Liability for Arbitrators and Arbitration Commissions

Unfortunately, both the civil law tradition and arbitration experience
in China do not yet provide a strong foundation for non-criminal means of
controlling arbitrator misconduct. In civil law countries, arbitration is
deemed as a matter of contract instead of a means of adjudication.419 The
arbitrator misconduct results in a liability similar to breach of contract.420
Since arbitrators are not government officials like judges, it is not likely for
them to commit a crime of dereliction of duty. 421 However, as outlined
earlier, arbitrators are viewed as judges in the context of China. But under
the civil law influence, Chinese law does not allow arbitrators to enjoy the
judicial immunities which are available to arbitrators in common law
countries. After all, arbitration in China has not been developed along with
the market economy, but occurred through official measures.422 Arbitration
416
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in China lacks the nongovernmental characteristics as well as a professional
regulation such as arbitrator ethics.423 In the background of a culture that
favors criminal law, penal regulation of arbitrator misconduct has easily
been thought the best option for China.
Arbitration develops because of market economy, and market forces
seem to function effectively and play a more important role than legal
rules.424 Any change of institution must be prudential, especially regarding
criminal law, as confidence in the criminal law is one of the most rooted
legal faiths in China. Chinese lawmakers seem to think that imperfect rules
are better than none, given the lack of market rules, the absence of industry
regulation, a code of arbitrator ethics, and civil liability, but fail to realize
that the cure is worse than the illness. In fact, “[e]nsuring the enforcement
of standards and providing meaningful remedies to those injured by arbitral
misconduct is equally as important as articulating standards of conduct and
professional ethics for arbitrators and provider institutions.”425 Thus, arbitral
institutions should enforce conduct standards enacted in the form of codes of
ethics. 426 More importantly, the conduct standards, norms, rules and
guidelines governing arbitrators’ professional conduct must be detailed
rather than merely provided as abstract concepts.
The basic role of arbitration is as a sort of legal service, which is, in
essence, the market participants’ self-regulation and unofficial dispute
resolution system without state intervention.427 Thus, the issue of quality of
service is critical, and the criterion of service recognized by the participants
is necessary for the healthy development of the market.428 If the quality of
service is lower than the standard of the market, and the service provider
cannot be expelled, the result would be a decrease in quality of service and a
collapse of the market in the end.429 In terms of arbitrator impartiality, it is
reasonable and fair to make a biased arbitrator—the provider of poor quality
service—assume some liability. The core issue here is not whether the
biased arbitrator should be liable, but how and to what extent he or she
should be liable. There are some market forces that discourage arbitrator
misconduct.430 Arbitrators wishing to attract business have an incentive to
423
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develop a reputation of impartiality. Arbitrators’ actions may be restricted
by custom, conscience, and concerns such as caring for their own reputation,
or being sympathetic to both parties so that they are obedient to the law,
even though there is no legal punishment.431
Civil liability may affect China’s future arbitration regime. As
discussed earlier, arbitration is largely an alternative process for resolving
disputes under private law. 432 Some commentators have presumed that
parties to an arbitration agreement have agreed to bear the risk of the
arbitrator’s mistake in return for a quick, inexpensive, and conclusive
resolution to their dispute.433 “[A]n arbitration proceeding is more properly
viewed as the product of contract.”434 All contractual agreements include
the obligation to perform in good faith.435 Where an arbitrator acts partially,
he or she betrays the principle of good faith and breaches the contract, which
breach gives the injured party the right to sue the biased arbitrator for that
breach.436 If a court determines that arbitrator misconduct existed in a case,
the aggrieved party is usually entitled to damages. The arbitrator could
demand additional payment up front to compensate for the civil liability that
he could face after the arbitration, which would be costly enough to make
arbitration less appealing. In order to attract customers, arbitrators compete
not only through the quality of their decisions and the desirability of their
procedures, but also on price.437 A single transaction can ruin an arbitrator’s
reputation. This, in turn, would give impartial arbitrators a price advantage,
as many arbitrators are repeat players.
From a policy perspective, it might even be desirable to hold
arbitration commissions jointly liable for arbitrator misconduct.
It
represents a transfer of the risk of liability from the arbitrator to the
commission, which is forced to internalize the costs of liability—causing it
to monitor the behavior of its arbitrators. Assuming that arbitration
commissions seek to attract business, arbitrators and arbitration commissions
will seek to develop a reputation for impartiality. If an arbitrator commits
Arbitration by “Perversion of Law” on account of pecuniary interest, it
certainly will have some impact on both the arbitrator and the arbitration
commission’s reputation. Fearing losing their job, the arbitrator, therefore,
431
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would have no reason to do anything other than attempt to act impartially in
the same circumstances and in the same fashion as a judge. Arbitrators’
current incentive towards corruption would be replaced by an incentive to
avoid unnecessary litigation. As a whole, the civil liability approach would
impose a duty on the arbitrator to handle cases in the same impartial fashion
as would a national court. Admittedly, there would still be some cases in
which the risk of bias remains, but a large share of the potential instances of
bias would be eliminated.
4.

Detailed Definitions of the Criminal Provision

By carefully defining the conditions of the criminal provision by
listing some of the specific situations, future judicial interpretation can help
make the enactment more workable. The more detailed it is, the more
authority the enactment has. Taking into account the relationship between
the spirit of arbitration and the purpose of legislation in practice, the judicial
authority may start from the stance of respecting the contractual nature of
arbitration and make some appropriate adjustments when interpreting the
law. For instance, the criminal provision can be restricted to domestic
arbitration. The “law” should not include foreign law because the criminal
law is a public law and should be strictly limited to a particular territory.
Also, the nature of arbitration requires more discretion than litigation and the
criteria of an arbitrator’s “Perversion of Law” should be different from those
of a judge. 438 Further, when defining the issues of the provision, some
principles such as party autonomy, good faith, public policy, and equal
hearing should also be followed.
V.

CONCLUSION

Rights carry with them corresponding responsibilities.439 It has been
recognized that arbitration rulings must be subject to some judicial review to
ensure that an arbitral proceeding is operating within a state’s legal
framework.440 This supports the conclusion that the judiciary should act as a
watchdog in supervising arbitrators and providing a remedy when necessary.
438
In accordance with the Arbitration Law, disputes shall be resolved through arbitration on the basis
of the facts, in compliance with the law, and in an equitable and reasonable manner. While the Civil
Procedure Law provides that in trying civil cases, a People's Court must take the facts as the basis and the
law as the standard. Clearly, the requirement of “in compliance with the law” is inferior to that of “the law
as the standard.” See Arbitration Law, supra note 6, at art. 7; Civil Procedure Law, supra note 57, at art. 7.
439
See Xu Qianquan, Zhongcaiyuan Falv Zeren Zhi Jiantao (仲裁员法律责任之检讨(上)) [The Criticism
of Arbitrators Legal Responsibility II], 9 ZHONGCAI YANJIU (仲裁研究) [ARB. STUDY] 35, 41 (2006).
440
Deng Ruiping & YiYan, supra note 430, at 117.
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However, the criminal provision of Arbitration by “Perversion of Law”
causes tension between arbitration impartiality and deference to arbitral
rulings. Particularly, the ambiguity of the provision makes it hard to
function. A better solution would be to use a judicial interpretation to
restructure the criminal provision. In the judicial interpretation, China
should tailor the offence as a private prosecution, alleging criminal liability
only for the neutral arbitrator. Further, China should provide detailed
guidelines for the criminal provision and civil liability for biased arbitrators.
A judicial interpretation concerning the criminal provision of Arbitration by
“Perversion of Law” can act as an effective mechanism to ensure both
impartiality and deference to arbitration without abandoning the criminal
provision. Thus, arbitration could have sufficient protection from the misuse
of government power while, at the same time, the necessary flexibility to
deter a biased arbitrator.
China has been seeking this balance for years. Arbitrators should be
required to assume liabilities in light of arbitral justice for losses of parties
incurred from their deliberate or negligent misconducts in arbitration. But in
order to realize the efficiency of arbitration, arbitrators should also be
granted a certain amount of immunity when performing their duties.
Maintaining the balance between these two needs depends on the
understanding of the nature of arbitration and the roles of arbitrators. This
balance reflects the different attitude towards arbitration. The diversity of
culture, tradition, and maturity of market economy among different nations
plays a very important role in distinguishing the policies and laws of each
nation. China may take specific measures within its own context to support
arbitration, but those measures should require deference to an arbitral award
to protect the legal rights of the parties.

